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UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA: A 
POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Wei Zhang* 
 
In this paper, I connect the text of the Chinese tort law with 
the institutional context of lawmaking in China from a political 
economy perspective. Two determinants, political influence and 
populist pressure, were identified for the tort law legislation in China, 
and a simple spatial model is presented to demonstrate the 
mechanism through which these determinants might have affected the 
text of the law. In particular, my research suggests that when 
tortfeasors’ political influence is kept constant, the populist pressure 
on the tortfeasor group tends to make tort law rules more favorable 
toward victims. In contrast, with similar populist pressure, the 
politically influential tortfeasors could mold legal rules to their 
advantage.  Even within a particular type of tort, the subgroup of 
tortfeasors who were better organized to exert political influence 
would be rewarded with more favorable tort rules than their less 
organized fellow tortfeasors, especially where populist pressure was 
moderate.  Hopefully, this research will inspire more efforts among 
students of Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the 
microscopic level against the macroscopic institutional backdrop of 
China. 
 
Introduction 
 
 China’s new Tort Liability Law (Qinquan Zeren Fa) is the 
last of the three pillars of civil law, together with Contract Law 
(Hetong Fa) and Property Law (Wuquan Fa).  But it is certainly not 
the least in terms of its practical importance.  A quick search of 
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judgments publicized on the Shanghai Court Net shows, for example, 
that during the four years after the Tort Liability Law became 
effective on July 1, 2010, the Tort Liability Law has been cited in 
33,746 judgments rendered in Shanghai.  During the same period of 
time, the number of judgments citing the Property Law, which took 
effect almost three years earlier, was merely 10,796, less than a third 
of the total citations of the former. 1  A few introductory works can be 
found in the English literature on the Tort Liability Law, 2 but none of 
them looked beyond the words of the law or delved into the impetus 
behind its terms.3  Indeed, there appears to be an inclination in the 
Chinese law scholarship to study the text and the institutional context 
of law in isolation. 4  Recently, more efforts have been made to 
                                                 
1 The search was performed on Oct. 13, 2014 at http://www.hshfy.sh.cn:8081/flws/.  
The search conditions were biased against the Tort Liability Law by setting the 
search period starting at the Law’s effective date.  A newly implemented law could 
not be applied to disputes occurring before its implementation, so the judgments on 
those disputes closed soon after the effective date of the law were unlikely to cite 
that law. 
2 See, e.g., XIANG LI & JIGANG JIN, CONCISE CHINESE TORT LAW (2014) 
(providing a multidimensional perspective to present a complete picture of Tort 
Laws in China); MO ZHANG, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE TORTS LAW (2014) 
(providing a comprehensive review of the modern Chinese tort system through an 
in-depth analysis of China’s Torts Law); Helmut Koziol & Yan Zhu, Background 
and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability Law, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 328, 
328 (2010) (providing an overview of the most important provisions in China’s 
Tort Liability Law).  For a comparison between the Chinese and American Tort 
doctrines, see Ellen M. Bublick, China’s New Tort Law: The Promise of 
Reasonable Care, 13 ASIAN PIC. L. & POL’Y J. 36, 38-41 (2011) (addressing 
similarities and differences between China’s Tort Liability Law and U.S. tort law 
provisions and suggesting ways to improve both). 
3 A recent paper on the medical malpractice disputes in China brought broader 
sociopolitical insights to the study of part of the Tort Liability Law, although it was 
mostly an inquiry into the implementation, rather than the terms, of the law.  See 
Benjamin L. Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 253-54 (2013) (suggesting limitations to contemporary 
understanding of both the functioning of the Chinese state and of the role of law in 
China, and adding to existing literature on the non-convergence of the Chinese 
system with existing models of legal and political development).   
4 For a rare exception to this inclination, see MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS 
OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND 
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS, 167-204 (1999) (providing a case study on the State-
owned Industrial Enterprises Law (Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Fa) and 
uncovering the competing interests giving birth to the pro-worker provisions of the 
law).  Tanner’s approach, however, differs from the public choice perspective of 
this paper. 
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account for the adjudicative behaviors of Chinese courts in certain 
specific areas of law under the overriding political and economic 
constraints, 5 yet such an institutional approach has not been amply 
extended to examine the legislative activities conducted by the 
various government entities in China.  This academic shortfall is 
probably a reflection of the long-standing suspicion about the 
relevance of formal legal rules in authoritarian states.  As detailed 
below, however, formal rules can be more relevant in these states than 
skeptics think. 
 To bridge this gap in the Chinese law scholarship, this paper 
aims to connect the text of the Chinese tort law with the institutional 
context in which the law was conceived.  Inspired by the public 
choice theories on lawmaking,6 I will analyze the critical roles of two 
factors in determining the orientation of tort law in China, the 
political influence held by tortfeasor groups, and the populist pressure 
aggregating against these groups.  Specifically, my analysis posits 
that the first determinant tilts the field toward tortfeasors while the 
second favors victims.  I will also introduce a model illustrating how 
these determinants may play a part in China’s policymaking process.  
Although the wisdom of public choice has been widely used to 
explain legislative behavior in the United States,7 to the best of my 
knowledge, this research is the first endeavor to apply these insights 
to a particular body of Chinese law. 
My study contributes to the literature in four respects.  First, 
it provides new thoughts about the law in books under an 
authoritarian regime.  Obviously, formal legal rules in China should 
not be taken at face value.  But the willingness and ability of powerful 
tortfeasors to extract rules of torts in their own favor, as demonstrated 
below, offers empirical support to my argument that, even in 
                                                 
5 See generally Liebman, supra note 3 (medical malpractice); Rachel E. Stern, On 
the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 L. 
& POL’Y 79, 79 (2010) (environmental torts); Xin He, Routinization of Divorce 
Law Practice in China: Institutional Constraint’s Influence on Judicial Behavior, 
23 INT’L J. L., POL’Y & FAM. 83, 83 (2009) (divorce). 
6 See infra Part III A (discussing the public choice theory of legislation that has 
vastly enriched our knowledge about the impetus behind lawmaking). 
7 See infra notes 65-66 (arguing that, while legislation can be consistent with the 
public interest or general efficiency requirement, public interest is not the primary 
concern in rulemaking and that the value of the public choice theory resides in the 
guidance it offers to understand the habitual undersupply of laws championing the 
public interest at the expense of well-organized pressure groups).  
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authoritarian states, the formal law is more than sheer political 
decoration and deserves careful examination.  Second, the paper 
reveals previously unnoticed driving forces behind China’s 
legislation on torts.  The political economy perspective creates a new 
landscape for the study of Chinese law and enables a nuanced 
understanding about the rhetoric of law in light of the political 
realities of this nation.  Third, this paper produces some academic 
ingredients potentially useful for the general study of Chinese law, 
including a spatial model delineating the political mechanism of 
lawmaking and an index evaluating the political influence of Chinese 
ministries.  Finally, the analytical framework of this research joins 
together the two prominent views on the Chinese legal system.  On 
the one hand, the system has long been considered to be politically 
biased,8 while on the other hand, many commentators believe it has 
also been eroded by populism in the past decade. 9  By taking both 
political influence and populist pressure into account, I intend to 
highlight the interaction of the two aspects in directing the course of 
lawmaking in China.  
One caveat is in order before unfolding my analytical 
framework.  As the first attempt at a complex subject, this research 
could not draw on rigorous data to test its theories simply because 
such data do not exist.  Despite my efforts to seek factual support for 
the analysis, it remains a formidable task to objectively specify the 
values of the key variables pertaining to the different types of torts 
surveyed below.  Hence, I cannot reject the possibility that the 
apparent consistency between the observation and theory is a result 
of the manipulability of the model. 10  This being said, “when the 
                                                 
8 For a comprehensive account of the political bias set in the Chinese judiciary, see 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, 280-330 
(2002).  For empirical evidence of such bias, see Michael Firth et al., The Effects 
of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China, 
54 J. L. & ECON. 573 (2011); Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead 
in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013). 
9 See infra note 23 (discussing China’s retreat from its claimed course toward rule 
of law). 
10 In this respect, my research shares the same weakness with other pioneering 
studies on the political economy of legislation.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward and Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 509 (1987). 
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theory and casual empiricism point in the same direction . . . the 
intellectual burden of proof should shift.”11 
 Part I sets out the scope of laws explored in this paper and 
describes briefly the legislative history of the tort law in China.  Part 
II discusses the intellectual significance of looking into the formal 
legal rules in general, and those of torts in particular, promulgated in 
authoritarian countries like China.  Part III develops the theoretical 
framework of my research drawing on the public choice literature.  
Part IV applies this framework to the Chinese tort law through a series 
of comparisons of rules across different types of torts and disparate 
categories of tortfeasors.  A short conclusion follows Part IV. 
 
I. Creation of the Tort Law in China 
II.  
Before we start a political economy inquiry into the Chinese 
tort law, it is essential to specify the laws to be examined in this study.  
For practical purposes, we must probe three categories of legal 
documents to have a clear picture of this field in Chinese law: general 
statutes, special statutes, and judicial interpretations.  Indeed, here 
“law” is used in a broad sense, including any formal authority binding 
in adjudication. 
 
A. Three Sources of Law 
In China, at the national level, civil liability resulting from 
tortious actions are governed by three distinct categories of laws: 
general statutes, special statutes and judicial interpretations. 
General statutes are comprehensive laws about tortious 
behaviors.  They lay down the basic rules applicable to various types 
of torts.  They are enacted either by the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) or its Standing Committee and are officially titled as “law” 
(falü), hence bearing the highest rank of effect among China’s official 
sources of law.  Usually, the NPC Legislative Affairs Work 
Committee (fazhi gongzuo weiyunhui) under the Standing Committee, 
a working body of the NPC, leads the drafting of general statutes. 12  
The process may involve a long period of time during which a series 
                                                 
11 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 599 (1995). 
12 TANNER, supra note 4, at 102. 
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of drafts are put forward and public opinions openly solicited for 
some of these drafts.  So far, there are two general statutes on torts, 
the General Principles of Civil Law (Minfa Tongze, hereinafter as 
“General Principles”) and the Tort Liability Law.  The former was 
passed by the NPC in 1986 and the latter by its Standing Committee 
in 2009. 
Special statutes are laws related to specific types of torts 
conventionally referred to as “special torts” (teshu qinquan) by 
Chinese lawyers.  This name comes from the fact that strict liability 
or res ips loquitur, instead of the regular negligence rule, is applicable 
to these torts.  In most cases, the special statutes do not deal with tort 
liabilities in particular, but are regulatory rules for specific industries. 
Some of these special statutes are promulgated by the NPC Standing 
Committee, hence obtaining the status of “law.”  Others are adopted 
by the State Council and are administrative regulations (xingzheng 
fagui), one rank lower than laws in terms of legal effect, or by the 
ministries of the State Council as departmental rules (bumen 
guizhang) with an even lower rank as a source of law.13  Regardless 
of their formal ranks, the ministry overseeing a certain industry often 
plays a key role in drafting the special statutes regulating that 
industry. 14  There are more than forty “laws” other than the general 
statutes, and still more administrative regulations and departmental 
rules, pertaining to tort liabilities.15  All of them are deemed as special 
statutes on torts in this paper. 
Besides the rules enacted by legislative and administrative 
institutions, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues various judicial 
interpretations on the adjudication of tort disputes.  The SPC 
interpretations either take the form of replies to requests of lower 
courts for instructions regarding particular cases, or stand alone as 
general directions on certain issues in tort litigations.  Whereas the 
former is usually short and written in an essay style, the latter is closer 
to statutes in terms of format and generality.  Although judicial 
                                                 
13 For the ranks of effect of the official sources of law, see Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法) [PRC Legislation Law] (Aug. 1, 2001), 
art. 79. 
14 TANNER, supra note 4, at 120. 
15 Wang Liming, SHENGMING WANG, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QINQUAN 
ZEREN FA SHIYI (中华人民共和国侵权责任法释义) [EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
TORT LIABILITY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 2 (2nd ed., China 
Legal Publishing House, 2013). 
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interpretations are not an official source of law, in practice, they are 
routinely cited in court decisions—especially the statute-style general 
directions—hence becoming a de facto source of law.  SPC derives 
its authority to issue interpretations in relation to the application of 
laws and decrees in adjudications from a resolution passed by the 
NPC Standing Committee in 1981.16  SPC issues not only the general 
provisions applicable to a wide variety of torts, but also judicial 
interpretations on certain specific types of torts, such as traffic 
accidents.  The drafting of judicial interpretations is completed within 
the SPC, sometimes with consultation with outside experts and other 
government institutions.  SPC also elicited public opinions for its 
recent statute-style interpretations.  However, the final adoption is not 
subject to any external approval. 17  No exact number of SPC judicial 
interpretations related to torts could be found during my research. 
 
B. A Brief History 
Of the above sources of tort law, the oldest one is the General 
Principles. 18  The SPC Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law (For Trial 
Implementation) (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing 
                                                 
16 QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GUANYU 
JIAQIANG FALÜ JIESHI GONGZUO DE JUEYI (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于
加强法律解释工作的决议) [THE NPC STANDING COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON 
STRENGTHENING THE WORK ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 1981), art. 2. 
17 Meng Hou, Zuigao Fayuan Guizhi Jingji De Shizheng Yanjiu (最高法院规制
经济的实证研究) [An Empirical Study on the SPC’s Role in Economic 
Regulation], 17-2 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL] 203, 
207-8 (2005).  This was also confirmed in my interview with Judge ZJ.  Interview 
by Wei Zhang with Judge ZJ in Shanghai (July 20, 2014). 
18 Before the introduction of the General Principles, the SPC issued the Opinions 
on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of Civil Policies and Laws 
(Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing Minshi Zhengce Falü Ruogan 
Wenti De Yijian) （最高人民法院关于贯彻执行民事政策法律若干问题的意见）
in 1984.  Part 9 of this judicial interpretation is about tort damages.  However, its 
provisions are highly incomplete.  It only contains a negligence rule for regular 
torts and barely touches on the special torts.  Besides, this documents is a mixture 
of substantive and procedural rules.  Thus, it is rarely regarded as the origin of the 
Chinese tort law. 
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“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze” Ruogan Wenti De 
Yijian (Shixing), hereinafter as “SPC Opinions”) was issued two 
years after this piece of groundbreaking legislation took effect.  Most 
of its provisions can be seen as clarification of the rules in the General 
Principles.  While the earliest special statute pertaining to tort 
liabilities appeared soon after the promulgation of the General 
Principles, the boom of such statutes came in the first half of the 
1990s.  Judicial interpretations often follow the special statutes to 
elaborate, and sometimes modify, the rules of the latter.  The vast 
majority of SPC interpretations applicable to tort litigation were 
issued in the twenty-first century, especially in the early years of the 
century.  In addition, the SPC issued in 2001 Some Provisions on 
Evidence in Civil Procedures (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu 
Minshi Susong Zhengju De Ruogan Guiding, hereinafter as 
“Interpretation on Evidence”) that exerted profound influence on tort 
litigation by demarcating the burdens of proof. 19  Premised on these 
prior legal documents, the Tort Liability Law was passed by the NPC 
Standing Committee five days before the end of 2009 after a drafting 
process spanning nearly a decade.20 
In a nutshell, the law of torts in China started with the General 
Principles, inviting a wave of special statutes in the 1990s.  These 
were followed by a series of judicial interpretations in the 2000s 
before they were consolidated in the Tort Liability Law that came 
into effect on July 1, 2010.  However, it is noteworthy that many of 
the special statutes and judicial interpretations on torts remained 
effective after the promulgation of the Tort Liability Law. 
 
III. Why Look at the Law of Torts in China? 
 
The motivation of the current study is to link the text of the 
law to the institutional context in which the law was created.  This 
assumes that the words of the legal documents are more than cheap 
talk that can be ignored in practice.  Therefore, the next two questions 
have to be addressed prior to a meaningful inquiry into the political 
                                                 
19 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Minshi Susong Zhengju De Ruogan Guiding 
(最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定) [Interpretation on Evidence] 
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002). 
20 The earliest draft of the Tort Liability Law was submitted to the NPC Standing 
Committee in December 2002. 
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economy of Chinese tort law: 1) why look at the formal law in China, 
an authoritarian state, and 2) why look at the law of torts? 
 
A. Why Look at the Formal Law in China? 
Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, many 
will question the value of looking at the text of its formal statutes 
since under such a regime what was written in books can be readily 
bent in practice.  Some commentators have stated that when the 
chance of enforcement is remote, formal laws could be phrased in 
more pro-the-masses rhetoric in China than in countries committed 
full-heartedly to the rule of law. 21   Others portrayed the everyday 
cases in China to be clustering under the rubric of “rough justice,” 
meaning adjudications are more in accord with informal problem 
solving strategies than the written laws. 22  From a broader perspective, 
many are skeptical about the impact of the formal legal institutions 
on China’s remarkable economic growth during the past three 
decades, 23 and still more have written on China’s retreat from its 
recently claimed course toward the rule of law. 24 
                                                 
21 Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory 
to Compare Laws, Power Distribution and Legal Environments in the United States 
and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 335, 337-344 (2007) (recognizing, however, 
that the formal law in authoritarian states would be more seriously applied where 
the parties involved held comparable political status).  
22 Stern, supra note 5, at 88-93. 
23  Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 1 (1996); Donald Clarke 
et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).  
See also William P. Alford, The More Law, the More…? Measuring Legal Reform 
in the People’s Republic of China, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE RIVER? CHINESE 
POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 122 (Nicholas C. Hope et al. eds., 2003); Xin 
He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 AM J. 
COMP. L. 419 (2009). 
24 E.g. Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011) 
(arguing that Chinese leaders' shift away from formal law is a distinct domestic 
political reaction to building pressures within the Chinese system); Hualing Fu & 
Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil 
Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Many E. Gallagher eds., 2011) 
(discussing the shift of priority from adjudicatory to mediatory justice); Benjamin 
L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality?: Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, 
in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE 
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I do not dispute the strength of the institutional constraints 
under which the law in books are implemented in China, but I contend 
that it would be an oversimplification to sweepingly discredit the 
pertinence of China’s formal legal rules.  On the one hand, such 
discredit stands at odds with the credible empirical evidence showing 
China’s Communist regime is facilitating, rather than inhibiting, the 
consolidation of its official legal institution.25  On the other, critical 
to the purpose of this paper, there is solid theoretical foundation to 
believe that the formal laws in authoritarian states can do more than 
showcase the hypocrisy of the regime. 
In one of their influential papers, Professors Moustafa and 
Ginsburg developed in detail the functions of courts as part of the 
official legal institution in authoritarian politics, 26 and many of their 
insights are applicable to the role played by formal laws in China.  
For instance, formal legislation can serve as documents to declare the 
policies cherished by the regime to achieve social control.  As 
Professor Damaška acutely pointed out, the law in an activist state 
“springs from the state and expresses its policies,” and “it tells 
citizens what to do and how to behave.” 27  Furthermore, to attain state 
objectives, “relatively stable standards” are indispensable. 28  Thus, 
“the activist state is driven to respect a degree of fixity in its law.”29  
Although not all activist states are authoritarian, an authoritarian state 
is frequently activist; China, in particular, fits squarely into this 
type. 30  Apart from the existent wisdom about the judicial system in 
authoritarian states, I will highlight two other aspects in which the 
                                                 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 165 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011) 
(discussing the embrace of modern forms of populist legality). 
25 Pierre F. Landry, Does the Communist Party Help Strengthen China’s Legal 
Reforms?, 9 CHINA REV. 45 (2009).  At the micro level, empirical evidence also 
ascertains the efficacy of formal laws in such areas as the labor market.  See Fan 
Cui et al.,, The Effects of the Labor Contract law on the Chinese Labor Market, 10 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013). 
26 Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in 
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-11 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008). 
27  MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 82 (1986). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 For example, in China, many rules governing personal claims against tortious 
actions are embedded in industrial regulatory schemes.  In addition, certain “rights” 
in China, such as the right to education under Art. 46 of the PRC Constitution, 
shade into obligations, which is characteristic of an activist state. Id. at 84 & n.22. 
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formal law can influence even those states that are not bound by the 
rule of law. 
First, the law in books can affect the settlement between 
parties in a legal dispute, even in the absence of the rule of law.  It is 
common sense among law students that, in states under the rule of 
law, parties frequently bargain outside the courtroom in the shadow 
of the law.31  Nevertheless, formal laws are nevertheless crucial to 
such bargaining even when the parties know that the official rules 
may not be strictly applied at trial.  This is because of the “anchoring” 
effect widely observed in human behaviors.  This behavior refers to 
a cognitive bias for a decision-maker to rely too heavily on the initial 
piece of information offered when making a decision.32   
Formal legal rules set up the threat values indicating the 
parties’ payoffs when the negotiation does not go through and the 
parties end up in the courtroom.  Hence, these values provide the 
benchmark to which the parties will refer in the bargaining process.  
In any event, a negotiated resolution to a dispute should not bring 
lower payoffs to the parties than their threat values. 33  Where the 
formal law is not faithfully followed, uncertainty may arise regarding 
the parties’ threat values. 34  While the parties understand that the 
outcome of a trial might be different from what a rigorous 
implementation of the law will dictate, they will have difficulty in 
adjusting their estimates to take into account the slackness in law 
enforcement.  The parties are likely to take the words of the formal 
law as a starting point for their adjustments.  Typically, such 
adjustments are insufficient.  As a result, the parties’ estimates of the 
actual outcome of a trial tend to be biased toward what the strict 
                                                 
31 For a classic study on this topic, see Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
225 (1982) and Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).  
32  Anchoring was first systematically discussed in Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 
1124, 1124 (1974). 
33 For the meaning and role of threat values in bargaining, see ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed.) 74-76 (2012). 
34 Of course, parties can feel uncertain about their threat values even in jurisdictions 
loyal to formal laws, usually due to the ambiguity or incompleteness of law.  My 
point here is simply that the greater variance of law enforcement will further 
aggravate this uncertainty. 
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enforcement of law would bring about. 35  In this sense, in countries 
without strict adherence to the rule of law, the terms of out-of-court 
settlements may as well be anchored to the mandate of these statutes.   
This anchoring effect is especially important to lawmakers in 
authoritarian states when they attempt to favor their patrons.  When 
the formal law sets threat values sufficiently low for groups 
disfavored by lawmakers, the anchoring effect will likely discourage 
these groups from making a demand in settlement bargaining high 
enough to correct the bias embedded in the law. 36  Consequently, 
terms of settlements that seemingly accommodate the disfavored 
groups’ requests in excess of their entitlements under the law will 
likely appease the disfavored groups without materially sacrificing 
the interests of the favored groups. 37 
Second, when the parties fail to settle and end up in trial, the 
formal statutes will be applied as default rules.  This is especially true 
where the judiciary is structured as a hierarchal authority. As 
Professor Damaška has observed, China is again a case in point.38  If 
a fault is found in the superior review of lower court decisions, 
                                                 
35 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 31, at 1128. 
36 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed.) 74-76 (2012). 
37 A good case in this point is my own experience in bargaining for compensation 
for the taking of our old residence in Shanghai.  By setting a low initial assessment 
of the property value and agreeing on compensation slightly higher than that 
assessment, the government successfully induced the majority of the residents to 
yield their property consensually.  But the paid compensations were just a meager 
portion of the tremendous surplus the local government and the developer would 
derive from the taking.  The initial assessment price was about 25,000 RMB per 
square meter, and the old residential buildings in this area were usually two stories 
high.  Newly developed projects at the same location are sixteen to thirty-one 
stories high and sold at an average price of 85,000 RMB per square meter.  (For the 
price information, see 
http://luxiangyuan021.fang.com/house/1211081506/housedetail.htm).  In other 
words, the originally assessed compensation for a piece of a two-story property 
with a premise of fifty square meters would be 2.5 million RMB, whereas new 
development on this same premise can be sold at 68 to 131.75 million RMB.  
Certainly, in most situations, the final amount of compensation was higher than the 
original assessment.  Based on our own case, the final compensation for a piece of 
property on a premise of 50 square meters would be around 12 million RMB 
including the potential premium from resale of the relocation property sold, at a 
discount, to the owners subject to taking, i.e. 9% to 18% of the average market price 
of the new development.  It should be mentioned that we did a hard bargaining with 
the government and were among the last 1% of residents to submit the property, so 
the above estimation is by all means on the higher end. 
38 Damaška, supra note 27, at 198-99. 
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“hierarchical organizations have a battery of instruments at their 
disposal to teach the errant official a lesson.”39  In China, the judicial 
disciplinary system for incorrectly decided cases (cuo’an zeren 
zhuijiu zhidu) plays a major part in this regard, which can bring career 
and financial sanctions to judges whose decisions have been reversed 
or sent back for retrial in superior review.40  Hence, in a hierarchal 
judiciary, “official discretion is anathema[.]”41  Instead, the so-called 
“logical legalism,” characterized by a tight attachment to context-free 
and general standards, is attractive to adjudicators under the 
hierarchical authority. 42  Such negative attitudes toward discretion are 
often heard among Chinese judges. 43  Thus, the explicit rules written 
in statutes become the best authority on which to rely in adjudicating 
commonplace cases.  In this sense, the judicial arbitrariness stemming 
from the absence of the rule of law is mitigated by judges’ reluctance 
to exercise excessive discretion in a hierarchical system.  This 
reluctance, in turn, strengthens the formal statutes with more 
authority rather than diminishing them in an authoritarian state. 44 
However, judicial reservation over discretion in authoritarian 
states should not be interpreted as volitional respect for the formal 
rules of law.  Instead, these rules are normally obeyed only in default 
of other superseding factors.  Such factors may include political 
intervention or policy considerations, prominently from local 
governments.  It is mostly because of these superseding factors that 
judges become willing to utilize various legal or extralegal devices to 
make decisions detached from a literal application of the law in 
books.45  However, to take advantage of the superseding factors, it is 
often necessary for the parties to credibly indicate their special 
circumstances before the judges.  More often than not, this implies 
extra costs incurred by the parties in dispute, such as tapping into their 
                                                 
39 Id. at 49.  
40 Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases, in 
CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 58, 64-
73 (Margaret Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011). 
41 Damaška, supra note 27, at 19-20. 
42 Id. at 22-23. 
43 Interview with Judge L, Shanghai, China (July 4, 2013); interview with Judge S, 
Shanghai, China (July 28, 2014). 
44 Previous studies on civil adjudications in China also found by-the-book decision 
making a routine of the judiciary.  See Stern, supra note 5, at 88. 
45 For some examples of such devices, see id. at 89-91. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
184 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
political resources or daring extraordinary actions to claim their 
relief. 46  In this sense, the formal statutes also help implement price 
discrimination so that preferential treatment beyond what the law 
permits will be awarded only to those who are capable of wielding 
additional influence on adjudications.  Through this discriminative 
practice, judicial favoritism is delivered in a more targeted way to 
better cater to the political priorities of the authoritarian regime.  
More crucially, this practice saves costs for the legislatively favored 
groups because, when encountering the disfavored groups, the 
favored groups only have to pay the fair amount in dispute resolution 
to the selected parties in the disfavored groups.  These parties are 
likely to be more politically powerful or go the extra mile to become 
the squeaky wheel that gets the grease.  As for the rest of the 
underprivileged groups, however, by-the-book enforcement of law 
will keep them in a disadvantaged position.  Therefore, in view of the 
possibility of discrimination, lawmakers are incentivized to design 
formal rules that adversely affect the groups they disfavor, similar to 
what a discriminative monopolist will do to the lower end of its 
market, 47 so that the highest possible cost savings can be achieved for 
their patrons.  Hence, the law on the books again becomes a 
battleground that cannot be easily conceded. 
 
B. Why Look at the Law of Torts? 
 First of all, tort law is vital to Chinese judicial practice.  Tort 
cases are among the most frequently litigated disputes in China.  In 
2008, for instance, the number of tort cases accepted by Chinese 
courts totaled approximately 992,000. 48   While administrative 
litigation has attracted substantial attention among students of the 
Chinese legal system, 49  in the same year, the number of 
                                                 
46 For an example of such extraordinary actions used in anti-discrimination cases 
in China, see Minzner, supra note 24, at 960; see also Xin He, Maintaining Stability 
by Law: Protest-Supported Housing Demolition Litigation and Social Change in 
China, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849 (2014) (discussing protestors’ use of collective 
administrative litigation to resist unfavorable housing demolition policies). 
47  For a monopolist’s strategy to administer price discrimination, see HAL R. 
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICRO ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH (7th ed.) 449-
450 (2006). 
48 WANG, supra note 15, at 2. 
49 Some important works in this line of research include Sean Cooney, Making 
Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People’s 
Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1050 (2007) (finding that while 
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administrative cases going to Chinese courts was a mere 108,398 50--
about one-tenth of the number of tort cases.  While studying 
administrative justice in China is unquestionably valuable, a 
tremendous piece of our knowledge of the Chinese legal system 
would be missing if the same scholastic diligence were not applied to 
other areas of law, such as contracts and torts, which account for the 
lion’s share of the courts’ everyday work. 
 In addition to its practical importance, tort law also brings 
good theoretical justifications.  Unlike contract law where contracting 
parties can tailor most of the rules, tort law involves statutory 
provisions that are mandatory.  Therefore, the law in books takes a 
more salient position in the area of torts.  The rules guiding tort law 
are less vulnerable to ex ante adjustments by the parties mainly 
because of the high transaction costs of private agreements.  For 
example, in automobile accidents, it is plainly impossible for all 
drivers and pedestrians to agree on the level of precaution that 
everyone should employ while driving.51  It is true that some types of 
torts are at the crossroads of contracts and torts, such as medical 
malpractice as reviewed below.  Accordingly, parties might have a 
chance to opt out of the tort system in advance.  However, this chance 
appears slim, at least in China.  For one thing, in many of these 
borderline situations, potential defendants have deeply affected the 
creation of the tort rules.  As result, it is hard to persuade such parties 
to agree on contract terms different from the statutory rules of torts.  
                                                 
Chinese administrative law insufficiently combats labor abuses, emerging 
regulatory innovation may eventually improve compliance with labor law); Ji Li, 
Suing the Leviathan—An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of 
Administrative Litigation in China, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 815, 815 (2013) 
(finding that “the rate of administrative litigation varies according to different 
levels of lawyer density and urbanization”); Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing 
the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75, 75 
(2004) (concluding that the promulgation of the 1989 Administrative Litigation 
Law resulted in only modest deterrent effects); Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: 
Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832, 832-833 (1997) (conducting 
an empirical analysis of the implementation of the 1989 Administration Litigation 
Law). 
50 The Supreme People’s Court of China, 2008 Nian Quanguo Fayuan Shenli 
Xingzheng Yishen Anjian Qingkuang (2008年全国法院审理行政一审案件情况) 
[National Statistics of the First-Instance Administrative Cases in 2008], 
http://www.pkulaw.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=1510116816. 
51 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 36, at 189. 
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In addition, the contract law in China simply allows the victim to 
choose between contractual and tort remedies in cases involving both 
a breach of contract and a tortious action.52  Coupled with the lack of 
a defense of assumed risk, 53 victims lack the incentive to accept an ex 
ante commitment to a level of care lower than the standard under tort 
law in return for a lower price on the tortfeasor’s service.  This is 
because the victim can always renege and fall back to the tort law 
standard. 54 
 Furthermore, a political and economic inquiry into the law of 
torts is sensible because this body of law tends to represent collective 
decisions and promote the collective goals of society.  In contrast, the 
law of contracts reflects predominantly individualistic decisions.  The 
law of torts is collectivistic to the extent that the payment and amount 
of damages for harm caused by risky behaviors are determined on the 
basis of state authority, rather than consensual purchases of the right 
to harm.55  In other words, under the tort system, the conditions and 
costs for one party (the tortfeasor) to take away the legal entitlements 
of another (the victim) are subject to the collective decision of society.  
This stands in stark contrast to contracts, where people are permitted 
to decide transaction terms on their own.  Having established that the 
tort law reveals collective decisions, it is appropriate to think of it as 
an outcome of the political process, making it suitable for a political 
economy analysis. 
 
IV. The Analytical Framework 
 
                                                 
52 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中国人民共和国合同法) [The PRC 
Contract Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 15, 1999), art. 
122. 
53 With such a defense, the victim’s advance agreement on an insufficient level of 
precaution by the tortfeasor may be considered an assumption of risk. 
54 In theory, the victim can agree on a higher level of care by the tortfeasor and also 
pay a higher price, in which case the victim will not have the incentive to renege.  
Such an agreement is nonetheless infeasible because it is often impractical to spell 
out the required level of precaution in the agreement and even more challenging to 
verify it before the court.  Verification is especially troublesome in cases requiring 
specialized knowledge.  In light of this difficulty, the tortfeasor will be incentivized 
to behave opportunistically after pocketing the higher price. 
55 Guido Calabresi, Torts – The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519, 
528, 534 (1978).  Torts also incorporate individualistic elements, as compared to 
the criminal law that collectively determines which type of risky behaviors are 
forbidden outright and sanctioned with severe penalties. 
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The literature is legion on the political economy of legislation 
in democracies.  From this literature, I will borrow a basic analytical 
framework and adapt it to the political and legal environment in 
China. 
 
A. The Public Choice Theory on Legislation in 
Democracies 
 In the last four decades since Stigler’s seminal work in 1971,56 
continuous efforts have been made to understand the official 
rulemaking process in democracies, mostly informed by the public 
choice theory. 57  His well-received insight that regulators are captured 
by the regulated and adopt regulations mainly in the latter’s favor was 
extended by Professor Peltzman to integrate different interest groups, 
consumers and producers into the rent-seeking struggle through 
regulation.58  In a similar spirit, the late Nobel laureate Gary Becker 
developed a generalized model to encompass the various 
determinants of political equilibrium out of interest group contests for 
influence. 59   In a slightly different context, when examining the 
evolution of law, Professor Rubin hypothesized that the statutory law, 
just like the common law, tended to approach efficiency only if the 
law would affect two well-defined small interest groups competing 
for advantageous treatment.60 
                                                 
56 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3, 3 (1971). 
57 There was an even longer history of the public interest theory on regulations 
before the public choice theory dominated the area.  This earlier theory argued that 
the principal government interventions in the economy were responses to public 
demands for the correction of “palpable and remedial inefficiencies and inequalities 
in the operation of the free market.”  The public interest theory, however, is now 
considered theoretically unsound and empirically unsupported.  See Richard A. 
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 336-
341, 350 (1974). 
58 Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 
211, 211 (1976). 
59 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983). 
60 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 
(1977) (positing that although statutes are often inefficient, lobbying for statutes 
can sometimes be a substitute for litigation); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and 
Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211-19 (1982) (finding support for the claim 
that “[p]recedents will also be efficient if parties . . . are symmetrically 
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 While the above literature uncovered the presence of interest 
groups in molding legislative preferences, another line of public 
choice research, known as the positive political theory (“PPT”), 
endeavors to relate the products of lawmaking to the specific 
institutional structures of lawmaking.  Inspired by Hotelling’s famous 
location model, 61  the classic works by the political economists 
Black 62 and Downs 63 broached the tradition to dissect elections in 
representative democracies using spatial models.  More recently, 
spatial models have been extended further to explain the legislative 
behaviors in a wider ambit encompassing the strategic interactions 
among different branches of government. 64  PPT recognizes that all 
political actors have a specified policy preference, and “[T]he core 
assumption . . . is that all relevant actors . . . act rationally to bring 
policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome.”65  To PPT 
scholars, the judiciary is no longer considered as having the final say 
on statutory interpretations, and the legislature, constrained by its 
internal structure, acts in response to executive choices as well as 
judicial decisions. 66 
 The public choice theory of legislation has vastly enriched our 
knowledge about the impetus behind lawmaking.  A number of law 
                                                 
distributed . . . but the efficiency is a by-product of the litigation process aimed at 
maximizing the wealth of the litigants”).  See also GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON 
TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1980). 
61 Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 41 (1929). 
62 Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 
23, 23 (1948). 
63 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
64 KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 123-41 (2nd ed.) (2010). 
65 McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1995). 
66 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 (1992) (arguing that the 
legislature reacts to judicial interpretations of statutes and that “interpretation is 
inevitably political”; John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: 
Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 566 (1992) (arguing that courts 
are an ameliorative force in correcting the incentive structure of the legislature); 
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 705-706 (1992) (outlining a framework that courts 
should use when interpreting legislation); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1207 (2007) (using the positive political theory to explore to what extent 
statutory expansion affects legislative policymaking). See also ROBERT D. COOTER, 
THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 213-39 (2000); SHEPSLE, supra note 64 at 123-41. 
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scholars have utilized the theory to shed new light on the creation of 
certain specific laws.  Some of this research is focused on pinpointing 
the interests of the different groups involved in the formation of law,67 
while others relied on spatial models to explain lawmaking under a 
particular set of institutional conditions. 68   Enlightened by these 
thoughtful works on legislation, I now turn to Chinese tort law from 
a political economy perspective. 
 
B. A Variant of the Public Choice Theory in China: Two 
Determinants 
 
1. Why a Variant? 
 As reviewed above, the public choice theory on lawmaking 
starts from identifying the interest groups affected by the law at issue 
and rests the analysis on the capacity of these groups to claim their 
territories within the given institutional structure.  The key insight of 
this academic tradition is that, instead of being motivated by the 
public interest, statutes and regulations cater to the requests of groups 
                                                 
67 E.g. Macey & Miller, supra note 10; Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy 
of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 311 (1988) (discussing the 
push by lawyers on the plaintiff and defendant side to bar reform to product liability 
laws); Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005) (arguing that 
reforms to international sales laws “. . . predictably failed to supply contracting 
parties with the default terms they prefer, thus violating the normative criterion that 
justifies the law-making process in the first instance”).; Peter V. Letsou, The 
Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 667 (1995) 
(contending that “ . . . the regulation of coercive collection powers of consumer 
lenders can be best understood as a contest among interest groups that is mediated 
by politicians with interests that go beyond obtaining the highest price for 
regulation”); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 111 (1987) (examining the need for takeover statutes and analyzing the 
politics involved in enacting a takeover statute in Connecticut). See also MARK J. 
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003). 
68  E.g. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 109-15 (2nd ed.) (2006); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Interpretation, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1418 (2003). 
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that can effectively deliver what the lawmakers need – be it votes, 
money, or information.69 
Whereas the influence of interest groups is still crucial to the 
analysis of lawmaking under China’s authoritarian regime, such 
influence alone cannot fully account for the substance of the law.  In 
democracies, where a typical voter remains “rationally ignorant” 
about public affairs, legislators can count on the interest groups to 
supply the essentials for political survival, votes in particular. 70  In 
this sense, rent-seeking is a tolerated element of politics in democratic 
states, at least when it stays within the boundaries of existing law.  
However, things are quite different in authoritarian states like China. 
First, under the strict state control over civil association, 
China has a dearth of social groups spontaneously organized by its 
citizens.  As well-known to the students of modern China, each self-
identified group in Chinese society “is allowed to be “represented” 
by only one body, and that body must reach an appropriate 
accommodation with the governing authorities”. 71  In other words, the 
opportunity to form an interest group is reserved only for segments 
with governmental endorsement.  At the same time, state-sanctioned 
groups are often awarded monopolistic positions to extract rents in 
return for their support of the regime.  Therefore, in China, as in many 
other authoritarian states, there is no level playing field for rent-
seeking, and rents are systematically transferred from the general 
                                                 
69 This is not to deny that legislation can sometimes be consistent with the public 
interest or the general efficiency requirement, especially when groups with 
opposing interests are competing for legislative favor. See Becker, supra note 59; 
Rubin, supra note 60, at 216 (stating that in 19th century England, polluters, who 
were the party with the ongoing interest, would prevail in court over the public 
interest).  The point is that the public interest is not the primary concern in 
rulemaking. 
70 People choose not to get informed because the cost of doing so exceeds its benefit.  
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES, 25-26 (1982); see also Becker, supra note 
59, at 391-94.  There are, of course, situations where the typical voter snaps to 
attention.  Then, in order to win the reelection, the legislators can no longer afford 
to neglect the preferences of the diffuse public.  R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC 
OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1992).  The value of the public choice theory resides, 
however, in the guidance it offers us to understand the habitual undersupply of laws 
championing the public interest at the expense of well-organized pressure groups. 
71  KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH 
REFORM 300 (2d ed. 2004). 
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public to the coalition that effectively governs the country. 72  Hence, 
rent-seeking by interest groups becomes a compromising factor for 
the legitimacy of the regime, which poses a serious threat to its 
security. 
Second, authoritarian leaders cannot rely on the interest 
groups to obtain accurate information necessary for their political 
survival.  The groups handpicked by the regime to extract rents are 
unlikely to reveal any intelligence working against the groups’ own 
interests.  Without effective counteracting forces to induce disclosure, 
authoritarian leaders are deprived of the chance to correctly evaluate 
the consequences of their policies and swiftly deal with potential 
challenges to their endurance.  It is just a reflection of the “dictator’s 
dilemma” predicating that the more effective a dictator is at 
repression, the less likely he may be able to use repression to remain 
in office. 73  This is because repression obfuscates the information 
needed to target repression accurately. 
Considering the characteristics of the authoritarianism in 
China, I postulate a variant to the public choice theory to analyze the 
Chinese law of torts.  In addition to the influence of interest groups, 
this variant takes populist pressure as the other determinant of the 
substance of the law.  Generally speaking, these two determinants are 
working in opposite directions.  While the interest groups exert 
influence to shape the law to their benefit, populist pressure moves 
the law to be more hospitable to their counterparties in tort disputes.   
Before assessing the effects of the two determinants, however, 
I should clarify that by no means do I attempt to claim that these are 
the variables sufficient to account for the entire body of tort law in 
China.  Other factors, such as the accepted practices in civil law 
jurisdictions, also contributed to the design of Chinese tort law.  The 
goal of my current project is more modest: it merely tries to tease out 
the components in the tort law indicating an underlying logic of 
political economy that have so far been missed by most China law 
scholars. 
                                                 
72  Stephen Haber, Authoritarian Government, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 693-702 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman, eds., 
2006). 
73  The term comes from RONALD WINTROBE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DICTATORSHIP 335 (1998), but the idea goes back to GORDON TULLOCK, 
AUTOCRACY 115–127 (1987) (discussing the possibility that a dictator can be 
removed from power). 
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2. Political Influence 
In China, government ministries are heavily involved in the 
operation of a wide array of industries ranging from railways and 
electricity to medicine. 74  These industrial groups are well-organized 
and derive highly concentrated benefits from rent-seeking.  On the 
contrary, the grass-root groups in China rarely survive legitimately,75 
and even if they are allowed to exist under the restrictive regulatory 
framework, it is hardly possible for them to challenge the interest 
groups tied to the government.  In effect, the Chinese legal system 
deliberately inflated the organization costs of the groups without 
governmental blessing so that they are paralyzed from producing 
collective goods for their members.  Considering the intimacy 
between the interest groups and the regime, the first determinant 
pertaining to the political economy of Chinese tort law examined in 
this paper is political influence. 
In the realm of torts, interest groups with official endorsement 
tend to be in the position of tortfeasors and are organized, whereas 
victims are usually unorganized.  This is especially true with respect 
to special torts, such as railway accidents or medical malpractice.  
The lack of organization of victim groups is partly attributable to 
impediments traditionally associated with organizing large latent 
groups, as identified by Olson.76  However, the Chinese government’s 
tight control over spontaneous social groups certainly intensified the 
                                                 
74 Although the economic reform has corporatized the operation entities in some of 
these industries into large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly held by the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
substantive management rights in such SOEs are granted to the ministries with 
supervisory authority over the relevant industries.  Li-wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, 
We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 726 (2013). 
75 Under the current Chinese administrative regulation, voluntarily organized social 
groups can acquire legitimate status only after approval by and registration with 
government agencies. Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (社会团体登记管理条
例) [Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 25, 1998, effective Feb. 6, 2016), art. 3 
(hereinafter “Regulation on Social Organizations”).  In addition, within each 
administrative region, only one social organization is allowed to represent a 
particular sector of society.  Id. at 13(2). 
76 OLSON, supra note 70. 
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difficulty. 77  Indeed, an attempt to organize salient victim groups can 
even bring about substantial risk of persecution. 78 
In passing, it is worth noting that, although the interest groups 
are more politically entrenched than the unorganized victims, their 
political influences are uneven nevertheless.  Part IV will make a 
rough assessment of the influences of a few of these groups. 
 
3. Populist Pressure 
If we assume the political influence of interest groups solely 
determine the formation of the Chinese tort law, given the absence of 
organized victims, we would anticipate the predominance of one-
sided rules favoring tortfeasors in the law.  In particular, we would 
not see rule changes tipping the balance toward victims without the 
emergence of potent tort victim groups.  As a matter of fact, we did 
see these changes.  Therefore, another factor must exist to moderate 
the effect of political influence.  This counteracting factor is populist 
pressure, which has been thought of as a critical feature of the 
Chinese judicial system in last decade.  Some Chinese legal scholars 
believe that populist pressure represented a change in policy, 79  
whereas others trace it back to China’s revolutionary legal practices. 80  
                                                 
77 Apart from the aforementioned general restrictions on voluntary associations, the 
regime is no more tolerant toward plaintiffs of group litigations.  For instance, the 
Chinese civil justice system adopts the less plaintiff-friendly opt-in rule in 
collective actions.  More importantly, courts, whose incentives are molded by the 
government agendas, dominate the process of collective actions.  Moreover, 
Chinese lawyers are subject to strict official surveillance when handling “mass suits” 
(quntixing anjian), and the contingency fee arrangements are no longer available to 
fund collective actions. Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, Collective and Representative 
Actions in China, 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/261321/media/slspublic/Chi
na_National_Report.pdf. 
78 The best-known case in this regard is the arrest and conviction of Zhao Lianhai, 
the father of a victim in the melamine-tainted milk scandal who became a leader in 
the parents’ movement to seek legal remedies and medical treatments for their 
children.  See Shiyu Wang, et al., Jieshi Baobao: Haishi Yige “Jie” (结石宝宝：
还是 一 个 “ 结 ”) [Stone Babies: Remaining a Complex], June 19, 2013, 
http://www.nandu.com/nis/201306/19/67650.html (describing the story of Zhao 
Lianhai and the travails he faced). 
79 Minzner, supra note 24, at 936. 
80 Liebman, supra note 24, at 166. 
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Evidently, populist pressure has loomed large in national politics 
since Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office in 2003 and prioritized 
“stability maintenance” (weiwen) on the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP’s) agenda. 81 
At the bottom of the regime’s emphasis on populist opinion 
might be a sophisticated strategy to retain political dominance of the 
CCP.  This strategy is closely associated with the fundamental 
difficulty faced by authoritarian leaders to gather correct information 
from citizens under their rule.  As noted by an eminent China scholar, 
unlike the democracies where the median voter’s opinion tends to 
prevail, the authoritarian government in China cares more about “the 
vocal extremists who are the most likely to take to the streets.” 82  Due 
to a lack of competitive elections, an uncensored news media, and an 
active civil society, authoritarian regimes have to rely more 
frequently on citizens’ radical behaviors, such as protests, to detect 
and deal with the discontented communities before they turn to 
counter-regime activities. 83  In this sense, extreme actions help the 
regime screen the genuine grievances that risk a revolt.  By appeasing 
only those truly dissatisfied parts of the society, the government can 
avoid indiscriminately buying off every section of the society, hence 
reducing the cost to maintain its rule. 84  A selective response to public 
opinions targeted at the intense discontents will also effectively 
showcase the regime’s concern about its citizens and improve its 
legitimacy. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think of authoritarian 
governments as always responsive to populist demand.  On the one 
hand, the strategy is adopted, after all, to preserve the regime.  As 
such, populist schemes aiming at toppling the government will not be 
                                                 
81 See KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA 
(2006); Steve Tsang, Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework, 
18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 865, 866 (2009) (defining five characteristics of 
consultative Leninism, the political system in China following the fall of 
Communism); Bruce J. Dickson, Populist Authoritarianism: The Future of the 
Chinese Communist Party, Presentation at the Conference on “Chinese Leadership, 
Politics, and Policy” 2 (Nov. 2, 2005),   
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Dickson.pdf (arguing that Chinese leaders face 
chronic, rather than acute, problems and that public opinion is “surprisingly 
complacent”). 
82 SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE POWER 44 (2007). 
83  Peter L. Lorentzen, Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in and 
Authoritarian Regime, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 127, 129 (2013). 
84 Id. at 133-36. 
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tolerated.  Consequently, populist pressure is likely to affect 
government policies only when its rhetoric is framed as accepting the 
regime’s legitimacy and narrowed to some particular economic issues 
or certain lower levels of the government. 85  On the other hand, an 
overly lenient response to popular demands will encourage 
communities without real grievances to take advantage of the 
government’s accommodating policies by stirring up false populist 
pressure.  In other words, excessive tolerance reduces extreme 
populist actions to cheap talk and compromises the credibility of 
populist pressure as a signal of social discontent. 86  To disincentivize 
fake populist actions, authoritarian regimes take measures to elevate 
the costs of those actions.  One example of such costs is the 
aforementioned requirement for careful rhetoric framing to 
distinguish a loyalist demand from a counter-regime uprising.  In 
addition, in the case of China, the government seems to use incentives 
and punishments discriminatorily, even to the participants of the 
same mass incident.  For example, while the vast majority of the 
participants of the riots in Shishou and Weng’an escaped without 
consequences, those believed to be critical instigators were jailed in 
the aftermath. 87  Uncertainty about penalties faced by activists in mass 
incidents further raises the costs of populist actions. 
In relation to torts, populist pressure is usually vented against 
some particular government agencies or the industries under their 
supervision.  These are often tortfeasors in some special categories of 
accidents.  Therefore, the strength of such pressure may well be 
correlated with the intensity and frequency of the accidents.  While 
the legal system is ill-equipped to confront the full range and quantity 
of tort claims resulting from China’s rapid social transformation and 
proliferation of new laws, populist activities in certain areas such as 
medical malpractice may serve as credible evidence of grievances 
meriting serious attention.88  At the same time, in the field of torts, 
since popular grievances are normally targeted at specific agencies 
and about specific rules of liability without broader implications on 
                                                 
85 Id. at 143-44. 
86 Id. at 135. 
87  Peter L. Lorentzen & Suzanne Scoggins, Rising Rights Consciousness: 
Undermining or Undergirding China’s Stability? 13 (Sept. 1, 2011), (unpublished 
manuscript presented at the 2011 American Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting) (on file with the author).   
88 Liebman, supra note 3, at 254. 
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the regime’s power to rule, chances are higher that the government 
will take a flexible position to cope with the popular requests. 
 
C. A Spatial Model 
 
1. Setup 
 The spatial model presented in this section is heuristic, mainly 
to illustrate a decision-making mechanism through which the above 
two factors will influence the legislative outcomes.  Rulemaking 
about torts can be depicted on a one-dimensional policy space of pro-
victim or pro-tortfeasor choices.  While political influence pushes 
laws toward the pro-tortfeasor end, populist pressure affects the law 
in the opposite direction. 
 Four players will jointly decide the location of the adopted 
rules in this space: the government agency (G), the SPC (C), the top 
CCP leaders (L), and the assembly making a policy choice (A).  They 
have the usual single-peaked preferences in the policy space.  This 
means the utility functions depicting their preferences over the policy 
alternatives under consideration have a maximum at some point on a 
line representing these alternatives and slopes away from this 
maximum on either side.89  Their preferences are functions of political 
influence and populist pressure.  G takes charge of drafting the special 
statutes on tort liability.  As noted above, the government agency 
often represents the interests of particular industries that tend to be 
tortfeasors of special torts; therefore, it prefers a pro-tortfeasor rule. 90  
The SPC is responsible for issuing judicial interpretations and is 
assumed to share the preferences of courts and judges.  Since judges 
are at the forefront of handling tort litigation, they are probably the 
most vulnerable to populist pressure.  From time to time, the judge 
presiding over a case is blamed as the culprit of an unpopular decision 
and risks his or her career or even personal safety. 91  On the other 
                                                 
89 SHEPSLE, supra note 64, at 92. 
90 This is not to deny the conflict of interests among different ministries generally 
present in the drafting of laws and regulations inside the State Council, see TANNER, 
supra note 4, at 127-29, 217-30 (describing the relationships between key 
lawmaking institutions).  Nonetheless, in the context of tort liabilities, victims’ 
interests are unlikely to be bolstered by the ministries for lack of organization of 
the victim group. 
91 A good illustration in this regard is the well-known Peiyu case in Nanjing.  Liang 
Guorui, Wangchuan: “Pengyu An” Huo Fanan? Heshi: Zhushen Faguan Wei 
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hand, judges usually do not reap sizable benefit from ardently 
upholding the interests of industrial tortfeasors.  Consequently, 
relative to other players of the game, C is presumed to take a pro-
victim position. 
The top leaders and decision-making assembly are deemed as 
two separate players to account for the collective decision-making 
mechanism inside the CCP, as pointed out in the recent literature on 
Chinese politics, without downplaying the role of the top leaders in 
steering policies in a calculated direction.92  The top leaders are the 
few people at the pinnacle of China’s power pagoda who are able to 
set up the policy agenda for the country.  The general secretary of the 
CCP and the Premier of the State Council are among the top leaders.  
The decision-making assembly is the top twenty-five to thirty-five 
people inside the power structure, normally including the members 
of the CCP Politburo. 93  These people make up the locus of the 
collective decision-making.  Considering their multifaceted policy 
objectives, L and A are postulated to have preferences in between G 
and C, but preferences may also differ between L and A.  In particular, 
I will introduce two assumptions about L’s and A’s preferences.  First, 
it is assumed that L’s preference is closer to G’s preference, as 
compared to A’s, when the level of populist pressure is low.  This 
assumption takes into account the more diverse composition of A, so 
its members’ preferences tend to be more heterogeneous than L. 94  
Since the head of the State Council, of which G is a part, is included 
in L, it is plausible that L will better entertain G’s concerns than A.  
The second assumption is that L is more sensitive than A to populist 
pressure.  This is a reasonable assumption if the ultimate 
                                                 
Tingzhi Jiancha (网传： “彭宇案 ”或翻案？核实：主审法官未停职检查 ) 
[Rumors on the Internet: The “Pengyu Case” May Be Reversed? Verified Facts: 
The Judge in Charge Is Not Suspended and Inspected] Guangzhou Daily (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2011-10/25/content_1509812.htm. 
92 The core leader is believed to have less power over his colleagues after Deng’s 
era, so the internal decision-making process of CCP increasingly takes on a 
collective flavor.  At the same time, he still holds the institutional power to convene 
and to preside the meetings of the decision-making group.  Lieberthal, supra note 
71, at 175, 211. 
93 Id. at 207-15. 
94 The elite decision-making group is considered to be less cohesive during the 
reform era and differentiated by functional area of work and degree of 
specialization.  Id. at 211 -15. 
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accountability for policy choices is more likely to rest on the top 
leaders than the decision-making assembly. 
 A status quo exists before the players take actions, and it is 
thought to be the provisions of the General Principles.  Naturally, the 
oldest rules on torts can be regarded as the status quo.  Furthermore, 
as detailed in the next Part, benchmarking the subsequent changes in 
rules against the General Principles also facilitates ascertaining the 
effects of political influence and populist pressure behind these 
changes. 
 I consider two different periods of time.  The first period 
contains up to two rounds of lawmaking, while the second period only 
has one round.  The players have fixed preferences at each period, but 
only L’s and A’s preferences can change between the two periods.  
For simplicity, I assume that the game is played independently at 
these two periods. 95 
 At the first period, L will decide whether to begin a 
lawmaking process to replace the status quo.96  When the process is 
started, G will make a proposal, after which A will decide whether to 
take G’s proposal.  If A rejects the proposal, the game at the first 
period will end and the status quo remains unchanged.  On the other 
hand, if A accepts G’s proposal, it becomes a new law.  But 
immediately after that, L can decide again whether to start another 
round of lawmaking.  If the process opens a second time at the first 
period, C and G can put forward competitive proposals for A to 
choose from, and the one who wins the competition will be the law 
at the end of the first period.  Of course, if the process is not reopened, 
then G’s original proposal remains the law when this period ends.  
The rules of the first-period game take into account an important 
restriction on C’s action, i.e. C can make a proposal only after G’s 
proposal has been adopted during the first round of lawmaking.  This 
                                                 
95 This assumption is innocuous for our purposes.  As shown below, the preference 
changes, as well as the resulting rule changes, often take a long time in China.  The 
two legislative periods usually span over ten years.  The assumption hence makes 
sense insofar as the players’ discount factors are not unreasonably high. 
96 This, however, does not mean that L will always be the original source of 
legislative proposals.  Consistent with Tanner’s finding, in my model, the top 
leadership does not have to commence the drafting of any proposal.  TANNER, supra 
note 4, at 212-13.  Instead, L’s key role is to decide whether a proposal initiated by 
other players will be placed on the official agenda of lawmaking, again in 
consonance with Tanner’s proposition that the top leadership endorsement is a 
pivotal stage in China’s lawmaking process.  TANNER, supra note 4, at 209. 
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is a reflection of the fact, as indicated in the legislative history of the 
Chinese tort law, that a judicial interpretation regarding a special type 
of torts can only interpret an existing law but not stand on its own. 
 At the second period, given a change of status quo in the 
previous period,97 and in case of a shift of preferences, L will decide 
whether to commence yet another lawmaking process.  If L chooses 
to do so, both G and C can make proposals and the one adopted by A 
becomes the law at the end of this second period.  Similar to the 
second round of the first-period lawmaking, G and C compete with 
each other to make proposals at the second period.  This is possible 
because once there is a law pertaining to a certain category of torts, 
C will be able to propose judicial interpretations on that law, whereas 
G can also propose amendments to the original law. 
 It is important to note that, despite the SPC and the State 
Council’s de jure authority to enact judicial interpretations and 
administrative regulations, respectively, the overarching power of the 
Party enables its leadership to retain de facto control over the 
rulemaking. 98  This is captured by L’s agenda-setting power and A’s 
approval power in the setup. 
 
2. Some Possible Outcomes 
 Since the purpose of this paper is to explain Chinese tort law 
in light of political motivations, I will present three consequences 
attainable in such a lawmaking game instead of offering a complete 
solution.  As we will see in the next Part, these consequences appear 
to be largely consistent with the actual state of the tort law in China. 
In Figure 1, the lower case sq, c, a, l, and g indicate the status 
quo and the four players’ ideal positions, respectively.  The Figure 
represents a scenario where the status quo is more sympathetic to the 
victims than any of the four players’ preferences.  The distances 
between their ideals satisfy the following conditions: 1) g-l < l-sq; 2) 
g-l < l-a; and 3) g-a < a-sq.  In this case, there is no change of 
                                                 
97 If the status quo did not change, then the second-period game would be played 
as a first-period game. 
98 See TANNER, supra note 4, at 64-66 (explaining that although the role of Party 
leadership with respect to  lawmaking has become less assertive—especially during 
the late 1980s—it probably still has power to influence the drafting process through 
vetoing and giving “prior approval” of laws before enactment).    
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preferences due to populist pressure between the first and second 
periods. 
 
Figure 1 Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations Without 
Preference Changes 
 
 
Pro-victim      sq              c                a           l        g     Pro-tortfeasor 
Period 1 & Period 2 
 
In the situation plotted by Figure 1, using backwards 
induction, L can predict that when it opens a second round of 
lawmaking, G and C will compete to make proposals while A will 
choose whichever proposal is closer to its ideal point (a), hence 
leading eventually to a law located at that point. 99  Therefore, L will 
start a second round only if the result of the first round of lawmaking 
is farther away from l than a is.  On the other hand, in the first round, 
A will approve any proposal made by G located closer to a than sq.  
With the knowledge of the other players’ choices, G will propose, in 
the first round, a law located exactly at its own ideal position g since 
given condition 3, A will approve this proposal.  Finally, foreseeing 
that g will be proposed and approved in the first round, L will be 
ready to initiate the whole lawmaking process in light of condition 1.  
Under condition 2, however, once g is approved, L will not open the 
second round.  Therefore, g, the most pro-tortfeasor legislation, will 
appear at the end of the first period.  Now that neither L nor A changes 
its preference, g will remain the law at the second period. 
In the second case scenario, the players have the same 
preferences at Period 1 as depicted in Figure 1, but L’s ideal position, 
l’, shifts to the left at Period 2 so that condition 2 above becomes g-
1’ > l’-a. 100  Figure 2 shows the second period of this case scenario. 
 
                                                 
99 This is the outcome of a typical Hotelling-Downs location model, see Hotelling, 
supra note 61; see also DOWNS, supra note 63 at 122 (applying Hotelling’s spatial 
market to argue that a “stable equilibrium” is possible for multiparty systems). 
100 A’s ideal position a is assumed to remain unchanged for simplicity.  However, 
this assumption is not essential to the revised condition 2).  If we denote A’s ideal 
position at Period 2 as a’, the generalized form of the revised condition 2) can be 
written as g-l’ > l’-a’.  Given that L is more sensitive to populist pressure than A, 
we will have l’-a’ < l-a.  Hence, the revised condition 2) can be satisfied insofar as 
L’s preference changes sufficiently so that g-l’ ≥ l-a. 
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Figure 2 Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations With 
Preference Changes: Less Pro-victim Than Status Quo 
 
 
Pro-victim    sq               c                   a      l’          g     Pro-tortfeasor 
Period 2 
 
As shown above, the first period of lawmaking will yield 
legislation located at g.  Now, expecting the outcome to be a, L will 
initiate the lawmaking process at Period 2 since, compared to the 
Period 1 outcome (g), this process will bring the law closer to L’s 
new ideal position l’ under the revised condition 2.  Consequently, 
after L’s preference changes, the law becomes more favorable to 
victims, though still less so than the status quo. 
Figure 3 illustrates the third situation with Panel (A) 
indicating the players’ preferences at the first period and Panel (B) at 
the second.  Here, at the first period, C’s ideal point, c, is to the left 
of the status quo, meaning the latter is no longer the most pro-victim 
stance.  In addition, unlike in the previous two cases, both A’s and 
L’s ideal positions are farther away from G’s preferred point, g, than 
from the status quo.  In other words, in Panel (A), the following 
conditions are met: 4) 0 < sq-c; 5) 0 < a-sq; 6) l-sq < g-l; 7) a-sq < 
g-a. 
 
Figure 3 Adoption of Special Statutes and Judicial Interpretations With Preference 
Changes: More Pro-victim Than Status Quo 
 
(A) 
 
 
Pro-victim   c            sq       a       l     g*                 g     Pro-tortfeasor 
Period 1 
 
(B) 
  
  
Pro-victim   c       a’  l’    sq                  g*              g     Pro-tortfeasor 
Period 2 
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 Knowing that, at the first period, the second-round lawmaking 
will result in a law located at a, backward induction will show that L 
will open that round only if a is closer to l than the outcome of the 
first round.  Since A will approve any proposal no farther away from 
a than sq in the first round, G will propose g* so that g*-a = a-sq if 
l > 𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2
+ 𝑎𝑎, or g*-l = l-a if l ≤ 𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2
+ 𝑎𝑎. 101  Given condition 5 and 
the assumption that l is to the right of a, it must be true that g*-l < l-
sq, 102 so L will initiate the very first round of lawmaking at Period 1.  
But at the same time, once g* is picked, a can never be closer to l than 
g*, hence excluding the possibility of a second round of lawmaking.  
In short, g* will be the law adopted at the end of Period 1. 
 At the second period illustrated in Panel (B), both L and A 
have changed preferences due to populist pressure.  In particular, their 
new ideal points, l’ and a’, satisfy the conditions 11) 0 < sq-l’; 12) 0 
< sq-a’, i.e. both a’ and l’ situated to the left of sq; and 13) l’-a’ < 
g*-l’.  Consequently, L is willing to initiate a lawmaking process at 
Period 2, which will lead to a law situated at a’, closer to L’s new 
ideal than g*.  Again, we see a new law more favorable to the victims 
after the shift of preferences.  Moreover, as both L and A changed 
preferences substantially, the new law leans even more toward the 
victims than the status quo. 
 
3. Discussion 
 In the above spatial model, strong political influence drags 
L’s and A’s ideal positions nearer to G’s peak of preference, whereas 
strong populist pressure works in the opposite way.  Accordingly, the 
first case scenario depicts an interest group that is politically 
influential and subject to mild populist pressure.  L and A cluster their 
preferences around G’s liking at both periods.  On the other hand, the 
second case can be associated with an interest group having strong 
political influence but also facing strong populist pressure, which 
leads L to make a moderate preference change at the second period.  
                                                 
101 See infra note 102 (explaining that g* must satisfy three conditions: 8) g*-a ≤ 
a-sq; 9) g*-1 ≤ l-a; and 10) g*-1 ≤ l-sq.  9) can be rewritten as g*-a ≤ 2(l-a).  Thus, 
when a-sq < 2(l-a), i.e. l > 𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2
+ 𝑎𝑎, 8) is binding; otherwise, 9) is binding.  As for 
10), it is always satisfied in this case). 
102 Id. (stating that l is to the right of a implies a-sq < l-sq and g*-l < g*-a.  Since 
g*-a = a-sq if l > 𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2
+ 𝑎𝑎, we will have g*-l < a-sq < l-sq.  On the other hand, if 
l ≤ 𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
2
+ 𝑎𝑎, from condition 5), it follows g*-1 = l-a < l-sq). 
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Finally, the third case scenario illustrates a moderately influential 
interest group confronted with strong populist pressure.  Thus, L and 
A shift their preferences considerably away from G’s. 
 The model suggests a first-mover advantage on G’s side.  
Since a law must be adopted before C can interpret it, G enjoys 
substantial freedom in shaping the initial law.103  By contrast, when 
C’s turn comes to make proposals for judicial interpretations, G will 
contest C by proposing amendments to the original law.  Such 
competition restricts C’s capacity to get its ideal policy.  G’s first-
mover advantage not only corresponds to the actual temporal order 
of rulemaking in China, but also accords with China’s political reality 
featuring a powerful executive branch and a weak judiciary. 104  Of 
course, G’s advantage grows larger as L’s and A’s preferences 
diverge farther away from the status quo relative to the distance 
between their preferences and G’s.  This means that within the 
executive branch, ministries with more political clout can fix a law to 
favor their positions compared to their less influential counterparts.  
 Another implication of the model is the CCP leadership’s 
capacity to use the judiciary to balance out the influence held by the 
                                                 
103 It is worth noting that, in practice, the government agencies’ advantage over the 
judiciary comes from a wide variety of sources other than the early movement in 
lawmaking.  In fact, the first-mover status is used to model G’s favorable position 
in the political system generally. 
104 For a classic study on the weakness of Chinese courts during the reform era, see 
generally Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty 
Years, 20 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 383, 383 (2000) (explaining that while the two 
decades of law reform since 1979 empowered legal institutions and legislation, 
courts still faced difficulties and obstacles as result of Maoist legacy, such as 
disorderly allocation of legislative power and continuing political interference).  
For administrative interferences over judicial enforcement of civil judgments, see 
Clarke, supra note 23, at 41-52 (explaining how “the dependence of local court 
personnel upon local government at the same level for their jobs and finances” 
empower local protectionism to thwart courts from executing judgments contrary 
to “state administrative organs and local power holders”).  This is not to deny, 
though, that Chinese courts may be gaining more power over the years.  See, e.g., 
Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power, and Politics in Chinese Courts, 
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW 
PROMOTION 180 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) (purporting that the judicial 
branch remains far less prestigious than the executive branch in China’s power 
structure.  The head of the latter is always a member of the most powerful Standing 
Committee of the CCP Politburo, whereas few Chief Justices fared better than a 
much lower-profile member of the CCP Central Committee when in office). 
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executive branch.  To the extent that the judiciary is more amenable 
to the leadership’s control, promoting its competition with the 
executive reigns in the conflicts between the latter and the Party 
leadership.  In effect, then, competition between the judiciary and 
executive is indeed a wrestling between the Party leadership as the 
principal and the executive branch as the agent.  Therefore, the 
leaders at the apex have a slightly larger decision-making circle and 
take center stage in my construction of the interaction among the 
political players.  This postulation seems congruent with the 
authoritarian characteristics of the Chinese regime.  Despite the 
tendency of decentralization inside this system, the CCP has 
maintained the ability to set the tone for the country’s key policies. 105 
 
4. Extension to General Statutes 
 The model discussed in this section can be adapted to 
illustrate the legislation of the Tort Liability Law.  The entity in 
charge of this legislation, the NPC Standing Committee (N), is at a 
similar position to the government agencies in that it also enjoys a 
first-mover advantage relative to the judiciary, as judicial 
interpretations come only after the statute.  Moreover, compared to 
the judiciary, it is more able to defy the Party leadership, although 
less so than the executive branch, mainly due to its higher institutional 
standing.106  A few adjustments to the model are nevertheless needed.  
First of all, N, though still subject to interest group influences, is not 
necessarily more pro-tortfeasor than L or A.  This is because, unlike 
G, N does not run or derive benefits from the injurious industries 
where the special interests crystalize.  Besides, as noted in Part I, the 
drafting process of general statutes is more transparent and 
responsive to the public, which curbs N’s impulse to be excessively 
                                                 
105 See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY’S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA (2008) 
(positing that despite decentralization, CCP has maintained its influence on national 
policy); see also Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government 
Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle? 58 WORLD POL. 505, 506 
(2006) (arguing it was China’s” authoritarian centralization”—before 
decentralization—that stimulated and laid the foundation for reform policies? the 
critical role of the top leadership in kicking off the reform policies). 
106 See TANNER, supra note 4, at 72, 92 (supporting the claim that the head of the 
NPC Standing Committee is usually a member of the Standing Committee of the 
CCP Politburo, while the members of the NPC Standing Committee are generally 
on the nomenklatura list of the Politburo).  
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pro-tortfeasor. 107  Second, L, as compared to A, does not have to stay 
closer to N in the policy space even before the populist pressure soars.  
This reflects N’s lesser significance to the survival of the 
authoritarian regime, causing top leaders to pay less attention to N’s 
preferences than to G’s.  Third, when analyzing the legislative game 
of the Tort Liability Law, the status quo should be the relevant rules 
in the special statutes or judicial interpretations existing right before 
the adoption of this general statute. 108  Finally, since the Tort Liability 
Law was promulgated very recently, changes in players’ preferences 
have yet to happen.  Thus, there is no need to consider the second 
period lawmaking occurring as a result of preference change only. 
 This adjusted spatial model will be used to explain some 
specific provisions of the Tort Liability Law in the next Part.  Suffice 
it here to mention two predictions of the model.  First, when the rules 
prevailing before the adoption of the Tort Liability Law coincide with 
A’s ideal point, the new general statute will revise these rules only if 
A’s preference has changed since the old rules were adopted.  These 
revisions should reflect A’s preference change.  Second, when the 
rules prevailing before the adoption of the Tort Liability Law do not 
coincide with A’s ideal point, the new general statute may revise 
these rules, even if no preference has changed since the old rules were 
adopted.  In addition, the revision will make at least one of L and A 
better off. 
 
V. Applying to the Law of Torts in China 
 
This Part applies the analytical framework described in Part 
III to the law in China regarding some special torts.  Special torts are 
                                                 
107 This implies that, in our one-dimensional policy space, N’s position, relative to 
G’s, would be no more favorable to the tortfeasors at any level of populist pressure.  
The literature on the people’s congresses seems to support this assumption.  The 
deputies are found to play the role of remonstrators and challenge the interests of 
industrial groups in the name of constituents. For further discussion, see Kevin J. 
O’Brien, Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s 
Congress Deputies, 1994 China Q. 359, 372-374 (explaining that while taking on 
the sub-role of remonstrator, the deputies “blend” it with their role as state agents 
to better ensure policy implementation against industrial groups, which pose harms 
to both constituent and state interests).  
108 But the General Principles can still be used as a benchmark to evaluate the 
effects of political influence and populist pressure on the formation of the Tort 
Liability Law. 
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of great interest to this study because the tortfeasors and victims lack 
reciprocity in many of these cases.  As mentioned before, the interest 
groups are usually the tortfeasors whereas the masses are the victims.  
Consequently, in special torts, it is easier to pinpoint the source of 
political influence and the target of populist pressure.  As the 
differences observed in the cross-sectional comparisons of rules 
governing such torts cannot be readily attributed to other factors with 
across-the-board impact on the development of the Chinese tort 
law,109 they lend support to the central argument of this paper. 
 
A. Cross-Type Comparisons 
 
1. The Benchmark for Comparison 
A consistent benchmark is needed for comparisons between 
different types of torts because they can be subject to different rules 
even without the impacts of political influence or populist pressure.  
I use the General Principles as the benchmark, and evaluate the 
effects of the two determinants of our interest by gauging the 
deviation of the subsequent rules from this benchmark in either a pro-
tortfeasor or pro-victim directions.  The General Principles is chosen 
for two reasons. 
First, the provisions of the General Principles incorporated a 
primary constraint on making private laws in China, i.e. the civil law 
tradition advocating academic input in legislation.  The legal 
academia was actively involved in the drafting of the General 
Principles.  Four eminent civil law scholars served on the expert 
advisory committee, 110 and one of them later chaired the drafting 
                                                 
109 See Wei Zhang, The Evolution of the Law of Torts in China: The Growth of a 
Liability System, in PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES (Wen Yeu Wang, Yun-chien Chang & Wei Shen eds., forthcoming) 
(suggesting that one factor with across-the-board impact on the development of the 
Chinese tort law is the general trend to better protect tort victims in China). 
110 Liang Huixing, Nanwang De 1979-1986: Wei Zhuhe Daoshi Wang Jiafu 
Xiansheng Bashi Dashou Er Zuo (难忘的1979-1986: 为祝贺导师王家福先生
八十大寿而作) [The Memorable 1979 to 1986: For Celebrating the 80th 
Birthday of My Advisor Jiafu Wang], CHINESE LEGAL SCI. WEBSITE (June 5, 
2010), http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.aspx?id=2665 (last visited Feb. 23, 
2016). 
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group. 111  As a result, the General Principles was clearly infused with 
heritages from the German and the Soviet laws. 112  In this sense, 
therefore, the whole policy space delineated in our model is under the 
overarching constraint of the civil law tradition of torts. 
Second, the General Principles seem to be free from both 
strong populist pressure and intense political influence.  Based on the 
participants’ accounts, the drafting was mainly conducted by the 
group composed of the NPC and judiciary officials, as well as law 
scholars.  This was a clear combination of elitists rather than populists.  
Unlike the more recent NPC legislative practices, the solicitation of 
feedback on the draft was not open to the general public, but limited 
to government agencies and law schools. 113  At the same time, these 
accounts also suggest that the government agencies did not have a big 
part in the drafting.114  The minor role of the government agencies 
might be a result of their underestimation of the importance of the 
law after several decades of a legal vacuum.  But it may as well be 
imputable to the tight drafting schedule.  The first draft of the law was 
completed within three months and its official version was submitted 
to the NPC one month later.  Eventually, the General Principles were 
passed merely nine months after drafting commenced.115  This short 
                                                 
111 Yuan Dingbo & Ma Chang, Jinian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze 
Banbu 20 Zhounian Xueshu Huiyi Juxing, Minfa Tongze Qicaoren 20 Nian Hou 
Chong Jushou (纪念中华人民共和国民法通则颁布 20 周年学术会议举行，民
法通则起草人 20 年后重聚首) [Drafters of the General Principles of Civil Law 
Reunited at the Academic Conference for the 20th Anniversary of the Promulgation 
of the Law], FAZHI RIBAO ( 法制日报 ), [LEGAL DAILY] (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=25803 (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
112 Jichun Shi, A Comparison Between The PRC General Principles of Civil Law 
and the General Provisions in Traditional Foreign Civil Codes (我国民法通则与
外国传统民法总则的比较), 7 SOC. SCI. (社会科学) 23, 24 (1986). 
113 Wei Zhenying, Canjia Minfa Tongze Qicao De Pianduan Huigu (参加民法通
则起草的片段回顾) [Recollection of the Episodes in the Drafting of the General 
Principles of Civil Law], REFORMDATA (Apr. 29, 2006), 
http://www.reformdata.org/content/20060429/25228.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2016). See also Liang, supra note 105 (detailing how the drafting principles of the 
General Principles involved active participation of legal scholars). 
114 Wei, supra note 112 (explaining the drafting process of the General Principles 
and the minimum involvement of the government agencies). 
115 Liang, supra note 110. 
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period of time simply did not allow for many rent-seeking efforts.  
Consequently, when comparing the trajectories of the various 
branches of tort law from their origins in the General Principles, we 
can disentangle ourselves from the confounding factor of legal 
tradition and sift out the real effects of the two determinants 
considered in this paper.  To some extent, such a comparison 
emulates the “difference-in-differences” strategy applied in 
quantitative analysis. 
 
2. Assessing Political Influence and Populist Pressure 
It is challenging to acquire the exact measurements of the two 
variables anticipated to explain the difference of tort rules.  However, 
there is rough yet sensible guidance to assess tortfeasors’ political 
influence and the populist pressure mounted against them.  As for the 
former, the clout of interest groups depends on the groups’ abilities 
to contribute to the sustainability and the political agenda of the 
regime.  Commentators believe that, after the Tiananmen Square 
protests in 1989, the Chinese Communist regime has adopted a wide 
array of co-opting policies to buy loyalty from the critical 
supporters. 116  The success of “a co-optation strategy is a source of 
rents.”117  As a result, those sectors apt to generate rents will have an 
upper hand in the race for political influence. 118  Therefore, we expect 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, RED CAPITALISTS IN CHINA: THE PARTY, PRIVATE 
ENTREPRENEURS, AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE (2003); BRUCE J. 
DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S 
PRIVATE SECTOR (2008) (explaining Chinese authoritarian regime preserved its 
power in the process of economic development and capitalization by “strategic co-
optation” of entrepreneurs from the private sector); Haber, supra note 72 at 701 
(“Far more common than the strategy of terrorizing the leadership of a launching 
organization is the strategy of co-opting it by buying its loyalty”). 
117 Haber, supra note 72, at 701 (discussing co-optation by presenting the views of 
Huntington who believed that “The fact is that there is ‘no representation without 
taxation’ and there are no exceptions to this version of the rule.” He continues by 
explaining that when “Oil revenues accrue to the state: they therefore increase the 
power of the state bureaucracy and, because they reduce or eliminate the need for 
taxation, they also reduce the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence 
of the public to taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for publics 
to demand representation”). 
118 See Victor Shih et al., Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the 
Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
166, 168 (2012) (confirming that creating short-term rents is more important than 
boosting long-term growth to bureaucrat promotion). 
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more clout going to the industries whose production technology 
allows for easy exclusion of competition with the help of government 
regulations.  As the resource and energy industries bear exactly this 
attribute, 119 they are good candidates to wield deep political influence 
on lawmaking. 120  Furthermore, as the CCP has shifted its priority 
from class struggle to economic growth in the past thirty years, the 
“Finance and Economics xitong” (meaning “system”) within the 
Communist regime has taken center stage in national politics. 121   
Therefore, those interest groups under its aegis, such as resource and 
energy industries, accumulated more political capital than the groups 
supervised by other divisions of the government. 
Anecdotal evidence abounds as to the political clout of the 
energy and resource industries in China.  The best-known example is 
the familial control over the electricity industry by Li Peng, the 
former Premier and NPC Chairman.  To add credibility to the 
anecdotal evidence, I created an index to evaluate the political 
influence of several ministries deeply involved in industrial 
operations.  The index is based on the political status of their 
ministers.  The higher the offices held by the ministers after they 
became heads of the ministry, the more influential that ministry is in 
the political system.  By contrast, that a ministry had a non-CCP 
minister indicates its relative insignificance in the system.  Ultimately, 
this index measures the average rank held by the ministers of a 
particular ministry.  It assumes that the politically promising officials 
                                                 
119 For the state monopoly of the upstream industries and markets in China, see Xi 
Li et al., A Model of China’s State Capitalism (Aug. 2015) (working paper), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061521 (explaining how the 
“vertical structure” attribute of Chinese state capitalism led to the phenomenon of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to dominate and control “key upstream industries” 
including energy).  
120  The political influence of the resource industries and its implication on 
economic growth is dubbed as the “resource curse” in the literature.  Although 
recent studies challenge the causal relationship between the abundance in resources 
and authoritarianism, it seems undisputed that the resource industries are more 
capable of creating rents for authoritarian regimes.  See THAD DUNNING, CRUDE 
DEMOCRACY: NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH AND POLITICAL REGIMES (2008); 
Stephen Haber & Victor Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? 
A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (detailing 
research and literature supporting a “causal relationship” manifested as a view that 
“economic and fiscal reliance on petroleum, natural gas, and minerals create and 
perpetuate authoritarian regimes”). 
121 Lieberthal, supra note 71, at 228. 
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have a better chance to be assigned to those trophy ministries 
controlling the government activities critical to the survival of the 
regime.  While the details of this index can be found in Appendix A, 
it is consistent with the proposition that the ministries overseeing vital 
economic resources fare better in terms of political clout.  In 
particular, the ministries in charge of electric power and railway 
transportation, compared to those administering health care and 
education, are more politically powerful according to the index. 
On the other hand, populist pressure against a certain industry 
is closely associated with the frequency and intensity of the defective 
services provided by this industry, and the former is related further to 
the prevalence of the services.  Unfortunately, no easy measurements 
of the frequency, and the intensity of defects are available.  I relied 
instead on an indirect measurement—the relative frequencies of key 
words related to a particular industry appearing on Sina Weibo, the 
most popular microblogging website in China.  The details of the 
calculation are explained in Appendix B.  This measurement entails 
several limitations.  First, the selection of the key words is arbitrary, 
although I tried to test the robustness of the results using different 
selections.  Second, Sina Weibao was launched only in August 2009 
and my key word searches were further confined to the posts 
published on or after September 1, 2009.  Most of the tort laws in 
China were adopted before that time.  Therefore, it is assumed that 
the relative strengths of populist pressure against the relevant 
industries after 2009 and in the early 2000s, when most of the judicial 
interpretations on torts were promulgated, are positively correlated.  
Third, only those who have access to the Internet are able to write on 
Weibo; therefore, the sample selection may be biased.  To make up 
for these limitations, I will also resort to anecdotal evidence in the 
comparisons that follow.  Crude as it is, this “key words count” 
approach may shed new light on the effect of populism on legislation 
in China beyond exclusive dependence on intuition.  The key words 
counts show that the industries of railway transportation, health care, 
and primary and secondary education are under much higher populist 
pressure than the electricity industry. 
In Table 1, the special torts considered below are classified 
according to tortfeasors’ political influence and populist pressure 
against them. 
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Table 1 Classification of Special Torts 
 
 Political influence 
Strong Weak 
Populist 
Pressure 
Strong Railway Accidents 
Medical 
Malpractices/School 
Accidents 
Weak Electric Shocks Traffic Accidents 
 
Traffic accidents are tabulated at the lower right corner as a 
tort of weak influence and weak pressure.  This is because, unlike 
other special torts, reciprocity exists between tortfeasors and victims 
of traffic accidents, especially with the prevalence of passenger cars 
in China.  In other words, there is no readily identifiable group of 
tortfeasors in traffic accidents, let alone a government ministry 
representing their interests.  Thus, no organized interests would press 
for rules favoring tortfeasors. 122  At the same time, public grievance 
against the drivers is mild.  As Table B shows, traffic accidents are 
relatively far from the center of Chinese Internet users’ attention, 
suggesting weak populist pressure against tortfeasors.   
 
3. Railway Accidents vs. Electric Shocks 
 As stated above, both the railway and electricity industries 
hold strong political influence.  However, while the former is also 
under strong populist pressure, the latter is much less pressured by 
the general public. 
Under Article 123 of the General Principles, railway 
transportation and high voltage electricity are deemed as highly 
                                                 
122  Since China adopted no-fault insurance, the insurer will have to pay 
compensation after a traffic accident, up to a limit, regardless of the applicable 
liability rules.  Therefore, the insurance industry does not have an interest in pro-
tortfeasor rules.  Arguably, pro-tortfeasor rules would benefit the automobile 
industry as lower liabilities induce more driving, hence promoting the sales of cars.  
In China, however, car sales have been robust since 2000.  The quarterly sales-
output ratio never falls below 96% (data source: National Bureau of Statistics).  
Thus, the automobile industry is in little need of expanding sales through the 
manipulation of tort law.  See 汽 车 产 销 率 _ 累 计 值 （ ％ ) on 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=B01. 
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dangerous operations (gaodu weixian zuoye).   Hence, both are 
subject to the strict liability rule, and the only defense to liability is 
intentional action by victims. 123   Nevertheless, the trajectories of 
lawmaking diverge thereafter. 
Under Article 58 of the Railway Law (Tielu Fa), a special 
statute enacted in 1990, railway companies can exempt their tort 
liability completely when personal injuries are caused by “victims’ 
own reason.” 124  This immunity clearly includes victims’ negligence 
and probably even their health conditions or physical features. 
The SPC adopted two judicial interpretations regarding 
railway accidents, respectively, in 1994 and 2010.  The 1994 SPC 
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Adjudication of 
Cases Involving Compensation for Railway Transportation 
Accidents (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu 
Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, hereinafter 
“Interpretation on Railway Compensation”), 125 defers completely to 
the Railway Law to immunize railway companies where injuries are 
caused by victims’ actions.126  This was replaced by the more recent 
judicial interpretation, the SPC Interpretation on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in Adjudicating Cases Involving 
Disputes over Compensation for Personal Injuries in Railway 
Transportation (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu 
Renshen Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti 
De Jieshi, hereinafter “Interpretation on Railway Personal 
Injuries”). 127   In this judicial interpretation, the SPC restricts 
                                                 
123 MinFa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by 
the Fourth Session of the Sixthby the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective 
Jan. 1, 1987), art. 123.  Besides, the comparative negligence defense under Article 
131 of the General Principles is meant to be applicable to abnormally dangerous 
activities. 
124 Tielu Fa (铁路法) [Railway Law] (promulgated at the Fifteenth Session of the 
Seventh Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sep. 7, 1990, effective May. 1, 
1991) 
125 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu Sunhai Peichang Anjian 
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理铁路运输损害赔偿案件若干
问题的解释) [the SPC Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the 
Adjudication of Cases Involving Compensation for Railway Transportation 
Accidents] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 27, 1994). 
126 Interpretation on Railway Compensation, art. 11. 
127 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Tielu Yunshu Renshen Sunhai Peichang 
Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi  (最高人民法院关于审理铁
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immunity to injuries caused by force majeure or victims’ intentional 
actions, including lying on tracks, collision with trains, 128 crossing 
junctions, and walking or sitting on rail tracks ignoring the signal or 
railway staff’s alert. 129  As for victims’ negligent or other intentional 
actions conducted after unpermitted entries into railway working 
areas (e.g. tracks, stations or trains), based on the degree of victims’ 
fault, railway companies are to bear 20% to 80% of the liability if 
they did not fully fulfill their duties of care, or 10% to 20% of the 
liability when they executed those duties. 130  Furthermore, railway 
companies’ liabilities will be no lower than 50% or 40% when the 
victim is a legally incompetent or restrictively competent person, 
respectively. 131  Finally, Article 13 of the Interpretation on Railway 
Personal Injuries imposes a complementary liability on railway 
companies when the injury is caused directly by a third party. 132  As 
a result, the railway companies need to step in and compensate the 
victims if the third party who has caused the harm fails to pay 
damages.  For certain types of third-party actions from outside the 
trains, such as throwing stones or hitting the train, the railway 
companies should compensate the victims first and seek indemnity 
from the third party thereafter. 
Although railway companies’ liability was ratcheted up under 
the latest judicial interpretation, on balance, it still appears lenient to 
tortfeasors in comparison to the rule set in the General Principles.  
The current law provides railway companies with the additional 
immunity of force majeure and holds them liable for third-party-
                                                 
路运输人身损害赔偿纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释 ) [The SPC 
Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Adjudicating 
Cases Involving Disputes over Compensation for Personal Injuries in Railway 
Transportation] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 3, 2010, effective Mar. 
16, 2010), art. 16. 
128 Id. at art. 5(2).   
129 Id. at art. 7.  Under this article, railway companies need to prove that they have 
fully discharged the duty of care to be immunized from tort liability. 
130 Id. at art. 6. 
131 Id. at art. 8.  A legally incompetent person is a minor under ten years of age, or 
a person with mental impairment who is unable to comprehend his or her conduct.  
A restrictively competent person is a minor from ten to eighteen years of age, or a 
person with mental impairment unable to fully comprehend his or her conduct.  
Nat’l People’s Cong., supra note 117, art. 11, 12, 13. 
132 Interpretation on Railway Personal Injuries art. 5(1) and art. 13. 
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caused injuries only complementarily in most situations.133  In cases 
of victims’ negligence, the General Principles arguably held railway 
companies 100% liable, 134 yet the judicial interpretation now reduces 
railway companies’ liabilities to as low as 10% if they are not 
negligent and no more than 80% even if they themselves are also 
negligent. 135  Admittedly, for a small part of victims’ intentional 
actions, railway companies’ tort liability is raised under the judicial 
interpretation, yet to a seemingly marginal extent.  Railway 
companies will be liable for at most 20% of the damages when they 
are not negligent. 136  Even when they are, since, relative to their 
negligence, victims’ intention would be viewed as a more serious 
fault, railway companies’ share of liability is very likely to be below 
50%. 
When it comes to high voltage electric shock accidents, the 
relevant special statute is the Electric Power Law (Dianli Fa) of 
1995. 137  In addition to force majeure, it accords full immunity to 
electric companies engaging in high voltage operations when victims 
are at fault, meaning intentional as well as negligent actions.138  At the 
same time, when the injury from an electric shock is caused by a third 
party, electric companies are not required to pay damages at all. 139 
In 2001, the SPC issued the SPC Interpretation on Several 
Issues in Adjudication of Cases Concerning Personal Injuries Caused 
by Electric Shocks (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chudian 
Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruo Gan Wenti De Jieshi, 
hereinafter as “Interpretation on Electric Shocks”). 140  It restricted 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 The comparative negligence defense might apply according to Article 131 of the 
General Principles.  However, under Article 2 of the Interpretation on Personal 
Injuries, tortfeasors strictly liable for tortious actions, such as railway companies, 
are generally allowed to claim this defense only if the victim is grossly negligent, 
a limitation unseen in the latest judicial interpretation on railway accidents. 
135 Id. 
136 Interpretation on Railway Personal Injuries art. 6(2) 
137 Dianli Fa (电力法) [Electric Power Law] (promulgated at the Seventeenth 
Session of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 
1996). 
138 Id. at art. 60. 
139 Id. 
140 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Chudian Renshen Sunhai Peichang 
Anjian Ruo Gan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理触电人身损害赔偿案
件若干问题的解释) [The SPC Interpretation on Several Issues in Adjudication of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/1
2016]                       UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA    215 
 
 
electric companies’ strict liability under the General Principles in 
three aspects.  First, Article 2 of this judicial interpretation held 
electric companies liable only if they were owners of the electric 
facilities. 
Second, Article 3 of this judicial interpretation provided 
electric companies with complete immunity in four situations: 1) 
force majeure, 2) victims’ suicidal or self-wounding behaviors, 3) 
victims’ criminal actions such as electric larceny, 4) victims’ actions 
inside the electric facility reservation areas and forbidden by laws or 
administrative regulations.  Among these four, the last situation is 
especially effective in protecting electric companies because many 
electric shocks happen inside the reservation areas and, according to 
Articles 53 and 54 of the Electric Power Law, any action inside these 
areas without approval from the electric power management authority 
almost certainly falls into this category. 
Third, where the electric company owns the facility and is not 
entitled to the above immunities, Article 2 of the Interpretation on 
Electric Shocks apportions liability among the parties involved 
according to the degree of causality between their actions and the 
injury.  When comparing the causality, the court can theoretically 
reduce the tortfeasor’s liability even without determining the victim’s 
negligence.  Since the judicial interpretation does not change the 
provision of the Electric Power Law forbidding victims to claim 
damages from electric companies when a third party caused the injury, 
electric companies do not have to compensate victims before they 
seek indemnities from the third party. 
Comparing the rules of these two types of torts, 141 we can 
clearly see that, while the special statutes were equally keen on 
tampering with the strict liability rules of the General Principles by 
expanding the immunities and defenses, the judicial interpretations 
obviously took a softer position against electric companies.  When 
the victim enters electric companies’ working areas without 
permission and engages in prohibited activities, electric companies 
enjoy complete immunity while railway companies are held strictly 
                                                 
Cases Concerning Personal Injuries Caused by Electric Shocks] (promulgated by 
Sup. People’s Ct., effective Jan. 10, 2001) (repealed 2013). 
141 Since both torts were subject to the same article of the General Principles, a 
direct comparison of the related special statues and judicial interpretations suffices 
to tell the difference in their respective deviations from the benchmark. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
216 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
liable for 10% to 20% of the damages.  In addition, railway 
companies’ proportion of liability can rise to as high as 80% if they 
are found to be negligent.  Also, electric companies are not subject to 
the minimum liability requirements, as railway companies are, in case 
of injuries suffered by incompetent or restrictively competent victims.  
Moreover, unlike electric companies’ full immunity, railway 
companies can be liable for harms caused by third parties.  Finally, 
the ownership requirement and causality comparisons are available 
only to electric companies.  However, it is worth noting that these 
differences are largely due to the judicial interpretation on railway 
accidents passed in 2010, whereas the earlier version did not frown at 
the approach taken by the special statute to reduce railway companies’ 
liabilities. 
These observations are consistent with the model presented in 
Part III.  The special statutes were enacted mostly in the first half of 
the 1990s when populist pressure had yet to exert influence on policy 
choices.  Thus, the government agencies in charge of the legislation 
managed to insert provisions more favorable to tortfeasors than those 
under the General Principles, and the judicial interpretations then 
enacted were likewise pro-tortfeasor.  Populist pressure against 
electric companies remains moderate, thanks mainly to the low 
frequency of high voltage shocks and the isolation of the related 
injuries.  In contrast, China’s railway system has been under immense 
pressure after a series of severe accidents.  For example, in April 2008, 
two trains hit each other following a derailment, killing seventy-two 
people and injuring over 400.142  Quite conceivably, populist pressure 
caused a preference change among the CCP leaders.  In the aftermath, 
the adopted judicial interpretation on railway accidents became less 
pro-tortfeasor than the special statute. 143  In contrast, without the same 
                                                 
142  Xinhua News Agency, Jiaoji Tielu Tebie Zhongda Jiaotong Shigu Queren 
Yunanzhe 72 Ren (胶济铁路特别重大交通事故确认遇难者 72 人) [72 Deaths 
Confirmed in the Catastrophic Traffic Accident on the Jiaoji Railway], 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/03/content_8093877.htm (May 3, 
2008). 
143 Indeed, with the further escalation of populist pressure in the aftermath of a 
disastrous high-speed train collision claiming 40 lives on July 23, 2011, even the 
special statute was revised more pro-victim to repeal the excessively low 
compensation limits for railway accidents, see Tielu Jiaotong Shigu Yingji Jiuyuan 
He Diaocha Chuli Tiaoli ( 铁路交通事故应急救援和调查处理条例 ) 
[Administrative Regulation on Emergency Rescue in and Investigation and 
Handling of Railway Traffic Accidents] (promulgated by St. Council, Nov. 9, 2012, 
effective Jan. 1, 2013) (originally enacted as Regulation of June 27, 2007).  
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populist pressure, the judicial interpretation on electric shocks took a 
position similar to the special statute in terms of offering extra 
protection to tortfeasors.  In other words, Figure 1 and Figure 2 
approximate the situations of the electric shock law and the railway 
accident law, respectively. 144 
Under the Tort Liability Law, the two types of torts are again 
subject to one provision.  Article 73 of the law immunizes railway 
and electric companies from tort liability for injuries caused by 
victims’ intentional actions or force majeure.  Victims’ negligence, 
on the other hand, merely reduces the companies’ liability.  Since the 
judicial interpretation contains rules more specific than the Tort 
Liability Law, it remains an important guidance to court decisions, 
even after the implementation of the Tort Liability Law.  Regarding 
railway accidents, the judicial interpretation and the general statute 
hold consistent views and complement each other.  Given the 
closeness in time of the adoption of these rules, they were essentially 
passed according to the same set of preferences of the CCP leadership, 
so it is not surprising to see compatible rules, as my model would 
predict. 
On the other hand, the Interpretation on Electric Shocks was 
repealed in April 2013 after the implementation of the Tort Liability 
Law.  Under the new law’s approach, victims’ negligence can reduce 
electric companies’ tort liability, but the companies are no longer 
entitled to certain favorable protections, such as the ownership 
requirement and causality comparison.  Despite the rule change, 
electric companies are nonetheless better protected than their railway 
counterparts in that no minimum liability is required for the former 
and that harm caused by third parties is immunized completely. 145  
Hence, populist pressure does seem to make a difference where 
tortfeasors have likewise strong political influence. 
Though there is no good reason to believe that the leadership’s 
preferences have shifted due to populist pressure, the rules of high 
                                                 
144  My model does not explain what motivated the SPC’s adoption of the 
Interpretation on Electric Shocks five years after the passage of the Electric Power 
Law in the absence of preference changes of the Party leadership.  Concerns outside 
the policy space of our interest might account for this action, such as encouraging 
nationwide uniformity in adjudication.  Instead, the model predicts that, within the 
policy space, the position of the law on electric shocks should not move, which is 
virtually in line with our observation. 
145 Interpretation on Electric Shocks, art. 2. 
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voltage electric shocks nevertheless have begun to favor 
victimstortfeasor.  Before the Tort Liability Law, the rules were 
probably located at G’s, rather than A’s, ideal position.  Therefore, it 
is possible that the general statute can push the rules in the pro-victim 
direction, even without the preference change.  Figure 4 illustrates 
this possibility. 
 
Figure 4 Adoption of General Statutes Without Preference Changes  
 
         
Pro-victim    gp            c                a       n   l    sq(g)     Pro-tortfeasor 
 
 Figure 4 is almost the same as Figure 1, but the status quo 
becomes G’s ideal position, g, because that was the rule prevailing 
before the Tort Liability Law.  Accordingly, I use gp to indicate the 
position of the General Principles.  The most important change in 
Figure 4 is the addition of n, the NPC Standing Committee’s preferred 
position.  The location of n satisfies the following conditions: 14) n-
a < sq-a; 15) l-n < sq-l; and 16) l-n < l-a.  Given condition 14, once 
N proposes n, A will approve it.  Due to condition 15, L is ready to 
open the lawmaking process when it foresees the outcome will be n.  
However, under condition 16, L will not commence a second round 
because it expects the result of that round to be a.  Thus, the rules 
move toward the pro-victim end without a change of preference in 
either A or L. 146  In this case, the new rule makes both A and L better 
off.  
 
4. Medical Malpractices/School Accidents vs. Railway 
Accidents 
Now, we compare medical malpractice and school injuries 
with railway accidents.  The tortfeasors of these torts are confronted 
                                                 
146 Indeed, condition 16 is unnecessary to this outcome.  Once conditions 14 and 15 
are satisfied, the new general statute always moves toward the pro-victim end.  The 
only difference is that the new law will be located at “a,” rather than “n,” when 
condition 16 is not met.  The situation illustrated in Figure 4, however, does not 
mean that populist pressure plays no part in determining the position of the law.  
Since no populist pressure pushes L’s or A’s ideal point toward the pro-victim end, 
“n” cannot be excessively pro-victim.  In particular, condition 15 must be satisfied, 
which explains why the Tort Liability Law permits more generous treatment of 
electric companies compared to railways. 
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similarly with strong populist pressure, yet they may have different 
degrees of political influence. 
Under the General Principles, medical malpractice is a regular 
tort and is subject to the negligence rule.  Plaintiffs must to prove the 
negligence of medical institutions in order to claim damages for 
medical malpractice.  This rule was inherited in two special statutes: 
the Measures for Handling Medical Accidents (Yiliao Shigu Chuli 
Banfa, hereinafter as “Medical Accident Measures”) and the later 
Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents (Yiliao Shigu Chuli 
Tiaoli, hereinafter as “Medical Accident Regulation”), both adopted 
by the State Council in 1987 and 2002, respectively. 147   In the 
Interpretation on Evidence, however, the burden is shifted to medical 
institutions to prove lack of negligence or causation between the 
relevant medical treatment and injuries. 148  In other words, the SPC 
applies res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice. 149   The special 
statutes merely regulate medical errors or lapses amounting to 
medical accidents that lead to both civil liability and administrative 
sanctions.  Hence, in theory, a mistake in treatment not held to be a 
medical accident can nevertheless be held as negligence, resulting in 
tort damages. 
In terms of the scope of compensation, the General Principles 
include only a sketchy provision.  In contrast, the Medical Accident 
Regulation includes itemized standards for assessment of 
compensation. 150  However, these rules are distinct from the more 
recent SPC Interpretation on Application of Law in Adjudication of 
Cases of Personal Injuries (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli 
                                                 
147 Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli (医疗事故处理条例) [Medical Accident 
Regulation] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 4, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 
2002) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61445.htm; Yiliao Shigu Chuli 
Banfa (医疗事故处理办法) (Medical Accident Measures) (promulgated and 
effective by the St. Council, June 29, 1987) 
148 Interpretation on Evidence, art. 4 (8). 
149 In practice, the key evidence in medical malpractice litigations is the inspection 
report on “medical errors.”  The Medical Accident Regulation demands the 
inspection to be conducted by medical review boards, whereas the judicial 
interpretation does not touch on the inspection institution.  Patients usually prefer 
judicial inspections implemented by non-medical institutions, yet hospitals strongly 
question the professional expertise of these institutions.  See Liebman, supra note 
3, at 195-203 (discussing the contests on inspection institutions). 
150 Medical Accident Regulation, art. 50. 
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Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, 
hereinafter “Interpretation on Personal Injuries”) effective since 
2004.151  Generally speaking, the victims of medical malpractice will 
receive substantially greater compensation under the SPC 
interpretation, especially in death cases. 152   To solve the conflict 
between the different bodies of rules about medical malpractice, the 
SPC issued the Notice on Adjudication of Civil Disputes over 
Medical Malpractices Referring to the Regulations on Handling of 
Medical Accidents (Guanyu Canzhao “Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli” 
Shenli Yiliao Jiufen Minshi Anjian De Tongzhi) in 2003, stipulating 
that the Medical Accident Regulation should apply only to medical 
accidents while the General Principles should govern incidents that 
constitute malpractice not amounting to accidents.  Although this 
notice came out before the Interpretation on Personal Injuries, the 
later judicial interpretation would nonetheless determine the scope of 
compensation in non-accident malpractice cases because of its 
general application to personal injury disputes covered by the General 
Principles.  Therefore, the so-called “dual-track” (eryuanhua) of 
compensation arises in medical malpractice cases.  Some 
commentators pointed out the anomalous consequence under this 
dual-track system that the amount of compensation could be higher 
for the less serious malpractices not qualified as medical accidents.153 
                                                 
151 Interpretation on Personal Injuries, art.19-29. 
152 Although the Interpretation on Personal Injuries itself does not provide for 
damages for pain and suffering, the SPC Interpretation of the Supreme People's 
Court on Problems regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for 
Emotional Damages in Civil Torts, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding 
Minshi Qinquan Jingshen Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高
人民法院关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释 ) 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems regarding the 
Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001) 
allows for such damages.  Courts frequently award both the death indemnity and 
the damages for pain and suffering in death cases when the Interpretation on 
Personal Injuries is applied.  The combined amount of these two items is much 
higher than the damages for pain and suffering acknowledged in the Medical 
Accident Regulation, which is capped at six times the average annual living 
expenses of local residents.  In Shanghai, for instance, the death indemnity alone 
can be as high as 803,760 RMB yuan (about $130,400) for urban residents using 
the 2012 standard, while six times the average annual living expenses of Shanghai 
urban residents in 2012 is merely 104,406 RMB yuan (about $17,000).  
153 THE CIVIL LAW OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE NPC 
STANDING COMMITTEE (hereinafter as “CIVIL LAW OFFICE”), QINQUAN ZEREN FA 
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The Medical Accident Regulation of 2002 is considered more 
pro-victim than its predecessor adopted fifteen years earlier.  For one 
thing, the new administrative regulation expands the definition of 
“medical accident” beyond the malpractices causing the most serious 
injuries under the old one.154  For another, the itemized compensation 
rules took the place of the older provision of one-time and capped 
damages. 155  However, the two legal documents promulgated in 2002, 
the Medical Accident Regulation and the Interpretation on Evidence, 
were inconsistent about the liability rules applicable to medical 
institutions.  One continued with the negligence rule while the other 
introduced res ipsa loquitur, which might suggest the Party leaders’ 
ambiguous attitudes toward medical malpractice at that time.  This 
being said, the actual difference is perhaps smaller than it appears.  In 
any event, the Medical Accident Regulation says nothing directly 
about the burden of proof, and it does not insist that patients should 
always initiate the critical proving process – the expert inspection by 
the medical review board.  Indeed, courts can follow the judicial 
interpretation by requiring hospitals to apply for the review and make 
them bear the expenses according to the Medical Accident 
Regulation.156  With regard to the dual-track compensation problem, 
it is probably less dramatic in practice than commentators believe.  
Above all, courts rarely award higher damages in cases where 
hospitals’ negligent practices do not amount to medical accidents. 157   
Moreover, even before the Tort Liability Law officially united the 
two tracks, abundant court decisions adopted the standard of the 
                                                 
LIFA BEIJING YU GUANDIAN QUANJI [THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND OPINIONS OF THE TORT LIABILITY LAW], 740 
(2010). 
154 Medical Accident Regulation, art. 2. 
155 Medical Accident Measures, art. 18; CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 740. 
156 According to Article 34 of the Medical Accident Regulation, hospitals will bear 
the cost of proof if they apply for the review. Medical Accident Regulation, art. 34. 
157 In my study on the publicized court decisions on medical malpractices made in 
Shanghai in 2011 and 2012, the average amount of damages awarded in cases of 
non-accident malpractices is considerably lower than in cases of medical accidents, 
both in absolute value and as a percentage of the plaintiff’s claim (the difference in 
absolute value is nearly 150,000 RMB and the percentage difference is about 40%).  
The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, and present even if we 
only compare the cases involving the disputes occurring before the Tort Liability 
Law took effect. 
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judicial interpretation to evaluate damages, especially about the 
disability indemnity. 158 
The public discontent with medical services continued to 
ferment after the early 2000s.  In fact, many Chinese judges believe 
that, together with land takings and employment disputes, medical 
malpractice is one of the three major origins of public petitions 
against the Chinese judiciary. 159  At the same time, many disputes 
resulted in violence, causing injury or even death to medical 
professionals.  These violent incidents have become a potential threat 
to social stability. 160   Against this complex backdrop, the Tort 
Liability Law has taken a mixed position toward medical malpractice, 
indicating the CCP leadership’s preference for some kind of balance 
between the public anger against medical services and the 
profession’s grievances against medical mobs.  
On one hand, the Tort Liability Law confirms res ipsa loquitur 
employed in the judicial interpretation, but limits its usage to three 
situations: where hospitals 1) violate the provisions of law, 
administrative regulations or other regulatory rules on medical 
practices; 2) conceal or decline to present medical records related to 
the dispute; or 3) falsify, tamper with or destroy medical records. 161  
The rest of medical malpractice is still subject to the negligence 
rule. 162  On the other hand, the Tort Liability Law also substantially 
restricts hospitals’ immunities.163  In particular, even when patients’ 
or their relatives’ non-cooperative behaviors have contributed to the 
negative consequences of treatment, hospitals are not exempt from 
tort liability if they are also at fault, which is an outright revision of 
the previous rule of full immunity in the case of patients’ fault.  The 
                                                 
158 E.g. Yuan v. PRC No. 411 Hospital, （2011）虹民一（民）初字第 3867 号; 
Lu v. Shanghai A Hospital, （2011）闽民一（民）初字第 7227 号.  
159 Interview by author with Judge ZC, in Shanghai, China, (July 9, 2013). 
160 A widely reported case of medical disturbance before the passage of the Tort 
Liability Law was the Fujian Nanping incident. See Wei Dong, Nanping “Yinao” 
Shijian Shishifeifei [Rights and Wrongs of the Nanping Medical Disturbance 
Incident], China Youth Daily (June 29, 2009), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2009-
06/29/content_2731661.htm (reporting a story of violence between a man’s family 
and the hospital where he died).  See generally, Liebman, supra note 3. 
161 Qianquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective Jul. 1, 2010) 2009 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 58. 
162 Id. at art. 54. 
163 Article 60 of the law only allows for three immunities, whereas the Medical 
Accident Regulation contains six.  Medical Accident Regulation, art. 33. 
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new general statute also expands hospitals’ duties through other 
channels.  For instance, regarding injuries due to transmission of 
contaminated blood, Article 59 of the law allows victims to claim 
damages from hospitals, even if the latter is not at fault.  Although 
hospitals can seek indemnity from blood providers afterwards, such 
indemnity will not be realized without difficulty. 164  Finally, the Tort 
Liability Law ends the anomaly of dual-track compensation.165  This 
means that, after the new law takes effect, assessment of damages in 
medical malpractice cases should follow the more generous standard 
in the Interpretation on Personal Injuries. 
We now turn to injuries occurring at primary or secondary 
schools.  The General Principles do not mention schools’ liability to 
minor students for injuries arising on their premises.  The SPC first 
set forth a rule in the SPC Opinions, requiring schools to “provide 
appropriate compensation” if they are at fault for the injuries suffered 
by minors without legal competence. 166  In 2002, the Ministry of 
Education also held schools liable for students’ injuries when they are 
at fault, though with several immunities. 167   Later on, the SPC 
expanded schools’ liability to cover all minors, whether incompetent 
or restrictively competent, in 2003.168  Under these rules, schools will 
be liable when they breach the duty of care in discharging their 
responsibilities of managing the campus or protecting and educating 
the students.  In addition, according to the Interpretation on Personal 
Injuries, schools bear complementary liability for injuries inflicted by 
external personnel on minor students in proportion to their fault in 
managing the campus.  This means that schools should be liable if the 
                                                 
164 CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 808. 
165 WANG, supra note 15, at 307. 
166 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing <Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minfa Tongze> Ruogan Wenti De Yijian (Shixing) (最高人民法院
关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见(试行)) [The 
SPC Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General 
Principles of the Civil Law (For Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., Jan. 26, 1988), art. 160. 
167 Xuesheng Shanghai Shigu Chuli Banfa (学生伤害事故处理办法) [Measures 
for Handling of Student Injury Accidents] (promulgated by the Dep’t of Educ. of 
China, June 25, 2002, effective Sept.1, 2002) art. 8, art. 12, art. 13.  This department 
rule ceased to be effective in 2010. 
168 Interpretation on Personal Injuries, art. 7. 
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external personnel causing the injuries cannot bear the tort liability in 
full or is judgment-proof. 
In a country with a stringent family planning policy, it is 
unsurprising that school safety has attracted great social attention.  
The department rules and the judicial interpretation came out in 2002, 
and the 2003 expansion of liability could well be understood as a 
reflection of such attention.  Although the department rules imposed 
a variety of conditions on pursuing liabilities toward schools, the 
provision of the judicial interpretation is rather straightforward, 
probably consistent with the Party leadership’s preferences at that 
moment.  However, the number of school injuries did not reduce 
thereafter.  In 2007, the Ministry of Education released the first 
governmental report on the safety situations of primary and 
secondary schools, admitting the increase of the on-campus injuries 
during the previous years. 169  This was also confirmed by the number 
of insurance claims associated with school injuries in Beijing. 170   
Therefore, the law continues to evolve under the constant populist 
pressure toward school accidents.  
Instead of applying the uniform negligence rule, the Tort 
Liability Law distinguishes injuries to students of complete 
incompetence from those to students of restrictive competence.  
Whereas the negligence rule remains for the latter, res ipsa loquitur 
now applies to the former. 171   Consequently, where completely 
incompetent (i.e. younger) students are injured, schools will have to 
prove that they were not negligent in carrying out their duties.  It is 
worth noting that schools’ liabilities are strengthened despite the 
practical difficulties in establishing a full-scale school liability 
insurance scheme. 172  Therefore, it is less likely a consequence of the 
development of the insurance market than a response to the ever-
growing public concern over campus security.  Moreover, schools’ 
complementary liability is kept in Article 40 of this new general 
statute. 
                                                 
169 2006 Nian Quanguo Zhongxiaoxue Anquan Xingshi Fenxi Baogao (2006 年全
国中小学安全形势分析报告) [National Report on the Safety Situation of Primary 
and Secondary Schools, 2006], CHINA EDUC. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2007), 
http://www.jyb.cn/cm/jycm/beijing/zgjyb/2b/t20070322_71880.htm.  
170 The number of claims rose from 273 in 2004 to 368 in 2006. See CIVIL LAW 
OFFICE, supra note 134, at 658-59. 
171 Tort Liability Law, supra note 156, art. 38-39. 
172 WANG, supra note 15, at 210. 
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In cases of medical malpractice and school accidents, the law 
started leaning toward victims in the early 2000s and turning more 
pro-victim than the General Principles—likely as a result of populist 
pressure.  These changes are conforming to the situation depicted in 
Figure 3.  But the momentum of populist pressure remained high and 
pushed for further adaption of the law.  The subsequent rule 
adjustments in the general statute can thus be thought of as geared 
toward the updated policy preferences held by the decision-makers of 
the CCP under the new sociopolitical environment. 
 Like the Chinese railway companies, hospitals and schools 
have been the center of populist pressure, yet the ministries running 
hospitals and schools do not have the political clout comparable to 
the Ministry of Railways.  Accordingly, the tort law rules have also 
followed different tracks of evolvement.  With respect to railway 
accidents, although populist pressure forced the rules away from the 
highly biased special statute, overall they still favor tortfeasors when 
compared to our benchmark, the General Principles.  As elaborated 
in the previous subsection, the original strict liability rule under the 
General Principles has been chipped away in a variety of aspects so 
that the applicable rules became closer to an ordinary negligence test.  
By contrast, when it comes to medical malpractice or school 
accidents, the current rules are patently harsher to tortfeasors than the 
General Principles.  Neither hospitals nor schools were subject to res 
ipsa loquitur under the earlier general statute.  Nevertheless, this 
severe rule applies to both in the latest general statute.  In addition, 
both are now liable, in one way or another, for injuries caused directly 
by a third party.  In sum, here we see the liability rule passing through 
the benchmark of negligence and approaching strict liability.  This 
comparison, therefore, evinces the impact of political clout when 
tortfeasors are confronted with high populist pressure. 
 
5. Traffic Accidents vs. Medical Malpractices/School 
Accidents 
 Traffic accidents are like medical malpractice and school 
injuries in that the tortfeasors lack strong political influence.  
However, unlike the other two categories of torts, the reciprocity 
existing between victims and tortfeasors moves traffic accidents 
outside the focus of populist pressure. 
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The General Principles do not have provisions dealing 
specifically with traffic accidents.  However, most tort law scholars 
in China agree that operation of motor vehicles is one of the 
abnormally dangerous activities specified under Article 123 of the 
statute, to which strict liability is applicable, with the only immunity 
being victims’ intentional acts.173  Since it is impractical to impose 
strict liability simultaneously on two motor vehicle drivers colliding 
with each other, this liability rule is appropriate only in cases where 
the accident involves both motorists and pedestrians or non-
motorists.174 
The NPC Standing Committee passed the Road Traffic Safety 
Law (Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa, hereinafter “Safety Law”) in 2003.  
In the initial version of the law, in accidents involving motorists and 
pedestrians or non-motorists, the former would be fully liable for 
damages in excess of the coverage provided by the mandatory traffic 
insurance unless they could prove that pedestrians or non-motorists 
had violated traffic rules and that the motorist had taken “necessary 
and proper measures” to avoid accidents, in which case their liability 
would be reduced.  In effect, strict liability was reaffirmed because 
motorists are the ultimate bearer of harm insofar as pedestrians or 
non-motorists are not negligent. 175 
The currently applicable rules to traffic accidents were 
established in the amendment to the Safety Law in 2007.  Article 76 
of the Safety Law first stipulates that motorists are liable in accidents 
involving motorists and pedestrians or non-motorists if the latter are 
not at fault.  It then allows motorists’ liability to be reduced, like 
Article 131 of the General Principles, when victims are proven to be 
negligent.  The thrust of the rule is again strict liability because 
motorists are still the ultimate bearer of harm.  However, ambiguity 
arises from to the last part of this article, where it states that motorists 
should bear no more than 10% of the liability if they are not at fault. 176  
This last part will be consistent with the strict liability rule if it applies 
                                                 
173 XINBAO ZHANG, QINQUAN ZEREN FA YUANLI (侵权责任法原理) [PRINCIPLES 
OF THE TORT LIABILITY LAW] 348 (2004).  Victims’ negligence was supposed to 
reduce tortfeasors’ liability.  See supra note 124. 
174  Accidents involving multiple motor vehicles are always subject to the 
comparative negligence rule. 
175 “Ultimate bearer of harm” is a term borrowed from COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
36, at 212 (referring to the party bearing the harm of accidents when nobody is 
negligent). 
176 Safety Law, art. 76. 
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only in the situation where the motorist is not negligent and the 
pedestrian or non-motorist is.  But without this limitation, Article 76 
would be mainly a rule of res ipsa loquitur.  It turns out that the first 
reading of the article is not only supported by China’s eminent tort 
law scholars 177 but is also the position taken by the vast majority of 
the provincial regulations on traffic accidents. 178 
Article 48 of the Tort Liability Law simply refers to the Safety 
Law for determining the liability in traffic accidents, and the latest 
judicial interpretation does not make any change to the rule. 179  It is 
therefore proper to assert that, as for traffic accidents between 
motorists and pedestrians or non-motorists, strict liability is the 
prevailing rule in China at present. 
The provisions about traffic accident liability are 
characterized by their similarity to the benchmark rules under the 
General Principles.  Indeed, the stance of strict liability has been 
maintained almost entirely.  In particular, when pedestrians or non-
motorists are not at fault, motorists will be liable, even if the actual 
cause of the accident is force majeure or a third party.  In this sense, 
of all the abnormally dangerous activities, motorists’ liabilities are 
the closest to the strict liability rule under Article 123 of the General 
Principles.  Considering the dearth of both political influence and 
populist pressure in traffic accidents, this closeness is not at all 
unexpected since we noted that the General Principles itself was 
enacted with relatively little impact of either factor. 
                                                 
177 E.g. Xinbao Zhang, Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Zeren Guize Yuanze De Yanjin Yu 
“Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa” Di 76 Tiao (道路交通事故责任规则原则的严谨与
“道路交通安全法”第七十六条) [The Evolvement of the Liability Rule of Traffic 
Accidents and the Article 76 of the Road Traffic Safety Law], 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=23523.  See also BIXIN JIANG, 
DAOLU JIAOTONG SHIGU SUNHAI PEICHANG [THE ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT 
DAMAGE COMPENSATION] 4 (2014). 
178  Of the twenty-six provinces that have included the relevant rules in their 
provincial regulations, twenty-three have essentially established the strict liability 
rule for motorists. 
179 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Sunhai Peichang 
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理道路交通
事故损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [The SPC Interpretation on 
Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Traffic Accident 
Compensation Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 27, 2012, 
effective Dec. 21, 2012). 
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Another unique aspect of traffic accidents is that they belong 
to an area of special torts where the general statutes, the special 
statute, and the judicial interpretation appear to converge.  This is 
foreseeable when neither political influence nor populist pressure 
plays a vital role in formulating the liability rules.  In such 
circumstances, the tastes of the various lawmaking institutions are 
less affected by the two determinants of interest in this analysis.  
Consequently, other considerations, be it fairness, efficiency, or legal 
tradition, rise in importance in the course of legislation. 
The characteristics of traffic accidents stand out saliently 
when compared to medical malpractice or school accidents, the other 
two types of torts with tortfeasors of weak political influence.  Under 
strong populist pressure, the extant rules concerning the latter two 
have evolved to a more pro-victim position than the General 
Principles.  Moreover, in both of these areas, the liability rules in the 
special statutes designed by the government ministries are clearly less 
favorable to victims than those from the judicial interpretations and 
the Tort Liability Law, because victims are assigned a heavier burden 
of proof or a wider range of immunities are allowed.  Given 
tortfeasors’ similarly weak political clout, these differences are 
indicative of the effects of populist pressure on cultivating the 
preferences of key players of lawmaking, as well as the creation of 
the equilibrium outcomes of this process. 
 
6. Traffic Accidents vs. Electric Shocks 
 The last cross-type comparison is between traffic accidents 
and electric shocks.  In both areas, populist pressure is supposedly 
insignificant, but the tortfeasors are more politically powerful in one 
case than the other. 
 I elaborated in the previous subsection that, with regard to 
motorists’ liabilities against pedestrians or non-motorists, the current 
rules of Chinese law are close to the provisions in the General 
Principles, the benchmark of our comparison.  In particular, motorists’ 
immunity is limited to victims’ intentional actions.  Force majeure 
and third parties’ actions are not even included.  In other words, 
motorists are required to bear stricter liability than other tortfeasors 
of abnormally dangerous activities, including electric companies. 
 On the other hand, as we have seen in subsection 3, rules 
governing electric companies’ tort liabilities in cases of electric 
shocks had been much more favorable to tortfeasors than the original 
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provisions in the General Principles until recently.  Even after the 
implementation of the Tort Liability Law, the relevant special statute 
remains effective thereby completely immunizing electric companies 
from injuries caused by third parties or force majeure. 
 The comparison between traffic accidents and electric shocks 
thus demonstrates that where populist pressure is mild, tortfeasors’ 
political influence can be decisive to the position of tort liability rules.  
The more influential the tortfeasors are, the more likely the law would 
be pulled closer to their preferred locus.  Indeed, although the rules 
now applicable to traffic accidents do not seem far from the General 
Principles, this has not always been the case.  The mutation of the 
rules might as well be a consequence of the demotion of an average 
motorist’s political status.  
 
B. Intra-Type Comparisons 
 
1. The Evolution of the Traffic Accident Law 
In section A, I have shown that, according to the Safety Law, 
motorists are subject to strict liability in accidents involving motor 
vehicles and pedestrians or non-motorists.  However, this was not the 
case for a substantial amount of time since the promulgation of the 
General Principles.  In 1991, the State Council enacted the Measures 
for Handling Road Traffic Accidents (Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Chuli 
Banfa, hereinafter “Traffic Accident Measures”), the first special 
statute on traffic accidents.  Articles 17 and 19 of the Traffic Accident 
Measures basically adopted a comparative negligence rule to handle 
accidents occurring not only between motor vehicles, but also 
between motor vehicles and pedestrians or non-motorized vehicles.  
Thus, the parties in traffic accidents should be liable according to the 
extent of their negligence. 180  At the same time, Article 44 of the 
Traffic Accident Measures restricted motorists’ strict liability to no 
more than 10% of damages and only in accidents causing death or 
serious injuries. 181 
Interestingly, the trajectory of the traffic accident law in China 
features an initial pro-tortfeasor movement in disregard of strict 
                                                 
180 More accurately, the Traffic Accident Measures looked to the parties’ violations 
of the traffic rules and deemed such violations as negligence per se. 
181 The amount of damages was capped at the average living expenses of ten months. 
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liability under the General Principles and later returns to this origin.  
This trajectory appears to be correlated with the prevalence of private 
car ownership in this country. 
 
Figure 5  Number of Privately Owned Vechiles (in 10,000s) 
 
 
Figure 6  Percentage of Privately Owned Vehicles in Civilian Vehicles 
 
              Data source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics 
 
As Figure 5 and Figure 6 show, the total number and 
percentage of privately owned vehicles in China have risen sharply 
in the 2000s.  In particular, the share of private cars in civilian 
vehicles first exceeded 50% in 2003 when the Safety Law was passed.  
This growth pattern of private vehicles suggests that the reciprocity 
between traffic accident victims and tortfeasors is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  In the 1990s, before the pronounced surge of private 
car ownership, vehicles were more likely to be owned by public 
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institutions or enterprises, and motorists were usually employees of 
these public entities.  At that time, in accidents involving motorists 
and pedestrians or non-motorists, tortfeasors were, on average, more 
influential politically than the victims.  It is unsurprising that the law 
was biased in motorists’ favor in light of the theory advanced in this 
paper.  After the substantial increase in private car ownership, 
however, the composition of motorists became diverse.  
Consequently, the benefit from lobbying for a pro-tortfeasor law 
diffused broadly among the general population and curbed the 
enthusiasm to press for such a law, even for the small proportion of 
public car owners.  This phenomenon probably explains why the 
liability rule of traffic accidents traversed through comparative 
negligence before coming back to strict liability, as increasingly more 
people turn out to drive on the road. 
In passing, it should be noted that the comparison in this 
subsection is longitudinal and could not be controlled for factors other 
than political clout that might have caused changes to the law over 
time.  For example, the rule adjustment in 2003 could be a 
consequence of the general trend to expand the protection of tort 
victims.182   Furthermore, the dip in tortfeasors’ political influence 
does not account for the slightly less victim-friendly amendment to 
the Safety Law in 2007, although it has probably brought the rules 
even closer to the General Principles.183 
 
 
 
                                                 
182 Zhang, supra note 109.  Nor did the comparison control the populist pressure on 
traffic accident disputes while the law was evolving. Thus, it is possible that the 
pro-victim movement of the law in the 2000s was fostered jointly by the decline of 
tortfeasors’ political prestige and the surge of populist pressure against the 
privileged motorists.  
183 Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国道路交通安全法 (2007 修正)) 
[Road Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China (2007 Amendment)] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, 
effective May 1, 2011).  Under the Safety Law of 2003, to reduce their liability, 
motorists had to prove both the victim’s negligence and their own innocence, 
whereas the latter no longer needs to be proven after the amendment, which makes 
the rule similar to comparative negligence under Article 131 of the General 
Principles. 
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2. The Special Treatment of Zoos 
 Under the General Principles, injuries caused by domesticated 
animals are regarded as a type of special tort.  Article 127 of the law 
holds animal keepers or managers strictly liable unless they can prove 
that the injury was the victim’s fault.  Noticeably, the General 
Principles does not distinguish zoos from individual animal keepers 
in terms of assigning liability.  To a large extent, the Tort Liability 
Law inherited this article, but with two important alterations.  The 
first alteration narrowed the scope of immunity conferred on animal 
keepers.  Currently, in order to avoid or even reduce liability, animal 
keepers will have to prove that the injuries were caused by victims’ 
intentional or grossly negligent actions.  In other words, victims’ 
ordinary negligence is no longer a defense to animal keepers’ 
liabilities.184 
 Whereas the new law has tightened the tort liability for 
ordinary animal keepers, 185  it has loosened the liability for zoos.  
Article 81 of the Tort Liability Law allows zoos to be exempt from 
tort liabilities insofar as they can prove that they have discharged their 
duty of management, even when the victims are not at fault.  In brief, 
when the injuries are caused by zoo animals, victims become the 
ultimate bearers of harm.  But in situations involving individual 
animal keepers, the animal keeper will bear the ultimate harm when 
nobody is at fault; indeed, the animal keeper is liable even if the 
victim is in ordinary negligence. 
 This patent imbalance between zoos and individual animal 
keepers was not unnoticed in the drafting process of the Tort Liability 
Law.  It was pointed out that zoos were usually for-profit, so no good 
justification could be found for their reduced tort liability. 186   
Regardless, the provision survived in the final version of the law.  
However, this result is again unsurprising in light of the political 
economy of lawmaking.  Unlike ordinary pet owners, zoos in China 
                                                 
184 Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009), art. 78. 
185  This change essentially reiterates the position taken by Article 2 of the 
Interpretation on Personal Injuries adopted in 2003, which is generally applicable 
to all strict liability cases.  See supra text accompanying note 124 (describing the 
use of the comparative negligence defense).  Therefore, it is likely a reflection of 
the global expansion of victim protection.  See Zhang, supra note 104 (arguing that 
the prevalent trend in tort law is expansion of protection for tort victims). 
186 CIVIL LAW OFFICE, supra note 148, at 146. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/1
2016]                       UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TORTS IN CHINA    233 
 
 
are public enterprises operated by local government agencies.  The 
Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens was established in 1985 
to represent the zoos nationwide.  Currently, it is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Development. 187  
In contrast, there is no family pet owners’ organization at the national 
level to date.  Hence, the difference in political influence between 
zoos and ordinary family animal owners is conceivable.  Although 
the zoos, as well as the government agencies overseeing their 
operations, are certainly not as politically prestigious as the ministries 
controlling railway transportation or electricity, they are probably 
also exposed to much less populist pressure. 188  Consequently, the 
interest group lobbying might have affected the drafters of the law 
behind the scenes, and the rule in zoos’ favor snuck into the new 
statute without stirring up much public dissatisfaction. 
 
3. The Exceptional Protection of Marine Environment 
Polluters 
 Tort liability for environmental pollution is provided in 
Article 124 of the General Principles, and the strict liability rule has 
been applied ever since.  However, the polluters of marine 
environments are entitled to certain unique protections unavailable to 
other kinds of polluters.  According to Article 68 of the Tort Liability 
Law, when the pollution is attributable to a third party, including both 
intentional and negligent actions, victims can claim damages either 
from the polluter or the third party ultimately responsible for the 
pollution.  In other words, the Tort Liability Law does not allow 
polluters to use third party actions as a defense to victims’ 
compensation claims.189  Most of the special statutes on pollution also 
                                                 
187 CHINESE ASSOCIATION OF ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS, 
http://www.cazg.org.cn/cazgintro/cazgintro.aspx?name=21 (last visited Mar. 11, 
2016).  
188  Based on the key words count in Appendix B, animal-related injuries are 
generally not of high public attention. 
189 Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009), Chapter 
VIII Liability for Environmental Pollution. Polluters can seek indemnity from the 
third party after compensating the victims.  
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take a position consistent with the Tort Liability Law.190  But there is 
one exception to this rule reserved for polluters of oceans.  Under 
Article 90 of the Marine Environment Protection Law (Haiyang 
Huanjing Baohu Fa), when the pollution of marine environment is 
attributable to a third party’s intentional or negligent actions, the third 
party will be liable for the damages.  Noticeably, this article remains 
in the latest amendment to the Marine Environment Protection Law 
of 2013.  Therefore, it preempts the Tort Liability Law both as a 
special law and a newer one. 
 The exceptional protection of ocean polluters appears 
puzzling, especially when we notice that such protection is even 
beyond the requirement of the relevant international treaty to which 
China is a party. 191  However, if we look at this exception from the 
political economy perspective, it becomes readily understandable.  
The prominent sources of ocean pollution is the leakage of oil tankers 
in the course of oil exploration and production.  In China, both oil 
production and shipping are controlled by giant SOEs.192  Not only do 
they have a concentrated benefit in lobbying for favorable liability 
rules, but they also have tremendous political influence as members 
of the energy industry key to the national economy.  These 
advantages are unavailable to other polluters, who are usually more 
diffuse and less politically eminent.  Indeed, a recent study shows that 
large SOEs, such as the China National Petroliam Corporation 
(CNPC), are always able to avoid paying significant compensation in 
                                                 
190 See, e.g., Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa (水污染防治法) [Law of Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution] (promulgated by the Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), art. 85 (detailing the circumstances 
in which the polluter is required to eliminate the damage and compensate the 
victims for losses suffered). Most other special statutes do not have a specific article 
about the polluter’s defense of third party actions, so the general provision of the 
Tort Liability Law will apply.  
191  Under Article 3 of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, the owner of a ship is not liable for oil pollution only if a third 
party’s intentional action or omission caused the pollution.  International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 3, June 19, 1975, 973 
U.N.T.S. 14097. 
192 For instance, the China Shipping Group boasts an annual oil-shipping capacity 
of eighty million tons, which is about a quarter of China’s annual oil import in 
2012 (data source: National Bureau of Statistics) 
http://www.cnshipping.com/ywybw/hyzy/ypys/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 
2015). 
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accidents of pollution, thanks to their political clout.193  In addition, 
unlike air or water pollution more detectable by ordinary citizens, 
ocean pollution is less striking to most people because of the 
remoteness of the pollution sites.  As a result, populist pressure is 
possibly weaker toward ocean pollution than other forms of pollution, 
which seems to be the case according to Appendix B.  Consequently, 
the tortfeasors’ strong political influence, coupled with weak populist 
pressure, provides a reasonable explanation for the extraordinary 
favoritism toward ocean polluters in Chinese tort law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I have identified two determinants of the rules 
concerning special torts in China and presented a simple spatial 
model demonstrating the mechanism through which these 
determinants have affected tort law within China’s power framework.  
My analysis pointed out the central role of the CCP leadership in 
shaping the rules of torts, as well as its preferences under the 
counteractive impacts of tortfeasors’ political clout and the populist 
pressure on these tortfeasors.  Ultimately, the survival requirements 
of the authoritarian regime have brought these determinants to the 
forefront of lawmaking in torts.  While organized interest groups 
excel at maneuvering the policy orientation in China, just as in 
democracies, the CCP’s recent governance strategy enables the 
otherwise muffled voices of tort victims to be heard in the course of 
legislation. 
 In particular, my research suggests that, when tortfeasors’ 
political influence is kept constant, the populist pressure on the 
tortfeasor group tended to push tort law toward favoring victims.  In 
contrast, with similar populist pressure, the politically influential 
tortfeasors could steer legal rules to their advantage.  Even within a 
specific type of tort, the subgroup of tortfeasors that was better 
organized to exert political influence would be rewarded with more 
favorable tort rules than their fellow tortfeasors, especially where 
populist pressure was moderate. 
                                                 
193 See Jing Leng, Cong Zhongda Huanjing Shigu Kan Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye De 
Shehui Zeren [Looking at the Social Responsibilities of Chinese SOEs from the 
Major Environmental Accidents] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
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 Of course, there are limits to my study.  I do not attempt to 
assert that the political economy perspective employed in this 
research is sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the law 
of torts in China.  Instead, I restricted my explorations to the special 
torts involving relatively definite and distinct groups of tortfeasors, 
for these are the fields of law where political factors are most likely 
to leave their footprint.  This means that the vast sphere of regular 
torts were not under the scrutiny of this analysis.  Even for the special 
torts within the scope of this study, the crudeness of the 
measurements of the key variables renders my application of the 
theory reliant on anecdotal knowledge and personal impression.  
Moreover, the lack of transparency in China’s political process 
reduces, to some extent, the description of its lawmaking apparatuses 
to an educated guess.  Finally, despite its conscientious design, the 
qualitative nature of the study could not fully control the confounding 
factors acting on the formation of the Chinese tort law. 
Alternative explanations might be conceivable for any of the 
aforementioned variations in the law of torts.  A coherent and general 
theory on the rules regarding a variety of torts, however, is more 
advisable than ad hoc accounts of the law in a particular area in view 
of advancing our holistic knowledge of lawmaking.  After all, the 
purpose of this research is to call academic attention to the political 
economy underlying the specific provisions of Chinese law, which, 
by and large, seems to have been left out of the scholarly agenda so 
far.  I hope my study will inspire more efforts among students of 
Chinese law to explore the operation of law at the microscopic level 
against the macroscopic institutional backdrop of this country. 
 
Appendix A: Political Influence Index for Some Ministries 
 
 This index was constructed according to the highest CCP or 
government positions held by the head of the ministries in charge of 
operating the related industries.  Ministers in office from 1949 to 
March 2013, when the last cabinet of the Hu-Wen administration 
stepped down, were included in the index compilation, and the 
positions they held were recorded up to October 2014. 194  Tier 1 
                                                 
194  The Ministry of Electric Power Industry was first formed in 1955, so its 
ministers from 1955 to March 2013 were covered by the index.  However, the 
ministers who held above-ministerial level positions when becoming ministers 
were not included in the index, for they were usually staffed to handle anomalous 
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leaders refer to members of the Standing Committee of the CCP 
Politburo, President of the PRC, Premier of the State Council, 
Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, or Chairman of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
National Committee.  Tier 2 leaders refer to members of the CCP 
Politburo.195  Tier 3 leaders refer to Vice President of the PRC, Vice 
Premier of the State Council, State Councilor, Vice Chairman of the 
NPC Standing Committee, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National 
Committee, President of the SPC, or President of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate.  Non-CCP ministers are ministers who are 
not a CCP member when in office.  For every ministry, each minister 
was counted only once, even when he or she had multiple offices of 
the same tier. 196  The index values were calculated using the formula 
below, and a higher value indicates higher influence: 
 
Index Value = 
# of Tier 1 Leaders∗3+# of Tier 2 Leaders∗2+# of Tier 3 Leaders∗1–# of Non−CCP Ministers∗1
# of Ministers
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
situations, such as public health crises or massive upheavals, hence not indicative 
of the ministries’ regular political importance.  An alternative index was 
constructed using ministers in the reform era from 1978.  No qualitative difference 
was found in terms of the strength of political influence among the ministries. 
195  According to a resolution passed on the 12th CCP National Congress, the 
members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Advisory Commission 
were conferred with the same political privileges as the Politburo members.  
Therefore, they were counted as Politburo members in the index. 
196 However, if a person served as minister of multiple ministries, he or she would 
be repeatedly counted in compiling the index for each ministry.  Besides, a non-
CCP minister holding a tier 3 leader’s office was counted both as a non-CCP 
ministry and a tier 3 leader (no non-CCP minister ever served as a tier 1 or tier 2 
leader). 
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Table A Political Influence Index for Some Ministries 
 
Industry Operated Name of Ministry 
# of 
Ministers 
# of 
Tier 1 
Leaders 
# of 
Tier 2 
Leaders 
# of 
Tier 3 
Leaders 
# of Non-
CCP 
Ministers 
Index 
Value 
Primary/Secondary 
Education 
Ministry of 
Education, 
State 
Education 
Commission 
12 0 0 3 2 0.08 
Electricity 
Ministry of 
Electric Power 
Industry, 
Ministry of 
Water 
Conservancy 
and Electric 
Power, State 
Economic and 
Trade 
Commission, 
National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commission 
10 1 1 4 1 0.8 
Health Ministry of Health 11 0 0 2 2 0 
Railway Ministry of Railway 13 1 2 3 0 0.77 
 
 
Appendix B: Key Words Count for Certain Types of Special 
Torts 
 The key words count is based on the microblogs posted on 
Sina Weibo from September 1, 2009 through January 15, 2014 (i.e. a 
total of 1598 days).  The mean of average daily percentages is the 
mean of the average daily number of microblogs containing the key 
words related to a particular type of torts, 197 as a percentage of the 
total number of the microblogs on Sina Weibo, during the covered 
period of time.  A higher mean suggests a stronger populist pressure 
against the tortfeasors of the particular type of tort.  Specifically, this 
value was calculated as follows: 
                                                 
197 To reduce the impact of outliers, only the key words appearing in no less than 
100 days during the covered period were included in the calculation. 
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Mean of Average Daily Percentages = 
∑ ∑ 𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑
1598
𝑑𝑑=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑=1 𝑁𝑁∗1598 ∗
100%, 
where N is number of key words searched pertaining to a type of torts, 
Bdn the number of microblogs containing the nth key word on the dth 
day, and Wd the total number of microblogs on Sina Weibo on the dth 
day. 198 
 
Table B Key Words Count for Certain Types of Special Torts 
 
Types of Torts Key Words Mean of Average Daily Percentages 
School Accidents 
primary school 
(xiaoxue), secondary 
school (zhongxue), 
primary and secondary 
school (zhongxiaoxue), 
kindergarten 
(you’eryuan), Ministry 
of Education (jiaoyubu), 
campus safety (xiaoyuan 
anquan) 
0.249% 
Electric Shocks 
electric power (dianli), 
state power grid (guojia 
dianwang), power supply 
bureau (gongdianju), 
electric shock (chudian) 
0.031% 
                                                 
198 As a simplified illustration, suppose we search two key words pertaining to a 
certain type of torts within two days.  The counts are indicated in the table below.  
Then the mean of average daily percentages for this type of torts is calculated as 
300
50,000+
200
35,000+
80
50,000+0
2∗2
 * 100% = 0.33%. 
  
 
Day 1 Day 2 
# of 
Microblogs 
Containing 
the Key Word 
(Bdn) 
Total # of 
Microblogs 
(Wd) 
# of 
Microblogs 
Containing 
the Key Word 
(Bdn) 
Total # of 
Microblogs 
(Wd) 
Key Word 
1 300 50,000 
200 
35,000 Key Word 
2 80 0 
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electric power (dianli), 
state power grid (guojia 
dianwang), power supply 
bureau (gongdianju), 
electric shock accident 
(chudian shigu) 
0.030% 
Medical Malpractices 
clinic (zhensuo), hospital 
(yiyuan), Ministry of 
Health (weishengbu), 
doctor-patient 
relationship (yihuan 
guanxi), medical 
treatment (yiliao) 
0.427% 
clinic (zhensuo), hospital 
(yiyuan), Ministry of 
Health (weishengbu), 
doctor-patient 
relationship (yihuan 
guanxi), medical 
accident (yiliao shigu) 
0.327% 
Railway Accidents 
high-speed railway 
(gaotie), railway (tielu), 
train (huoche), rail motor 
car (dongche), Ministry 
of Railway (tiedaobu) 
0.306% 
high-speed railway 
(gaotie), train (huoche), 
rail motor car (dongche), 
railway bureau (tieluju), 
Ministry of Railway 
(tiedaobu), railway 
accident (tielu shigu) 
0.265% 
Traffic Accidents 
traffic accident (jiaotong 
shigu), motor vehicle 
accident (jidongche 
shigu) 
0.0099% 
Injuries by Domestic 
Animals 
injuries by animals 
(dongwu shangren), zoo 
(dongwuyuan) 
0.0158% 
Environmental Pollution 
environmental pollution 
(huanjing wuran), ocean 
pollution (haiyang 
wuran), water pollution 
(shui wuran), air 
pollution (daqi wuran), 
PM 2.5, solid waste 
pollution (guti feiwu 
wuran) 
0.00181% 
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air pollution (daqi 
wuran), PM 2.5 0.00104% 
water pollution (shui 
wuran) 0.00357% 
ocean pollution (haiyang 
wuran) 0.000123% 
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